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AcA_ ic economists have traditionally supported the basic purposes and
underlying assumptions of the antitrust laws, stressing the feasibility and
desirability of competition as the prime regulator of economic activity. Their
major criticisms in the past have been directed not so much against the laws
themselves as against the Supreme Court's adoption and application of a
qualifying "rule of reason" in interpreting them between 1911 and 1936.1
Under this test, the illegality of big businesses did not depend on the enjoyment
of monopoly power, but on whether or not defendants had obtained or
exerted economic power "unreasonably"-e.g., employing predatory cumpeti-
tive tactics - thereby evincing an "intent to monopolize." Many economists
felt that the rule of reason rendered the law impotent.2
The last decade has witnessed a striking reversal in judicial interpretation
of the antitrust laws. There has been some tendency for the courts to dilute the
rule of reason, creating a more effective "new" Sherman, as well as Clayton,
Act.3 This dilution has been manifested by a tendency to condemn per se
business size, integration, and monopoly power. The courts have also been
condemning such business practices and procedures as differential pricing, ex-
clusive dealing, and tie-in agreements, on the ground that by these tactics
tAssociate Professor of Economics, Cornell University. The author wishes to acknowl-
edge the extremely helpful suggestions and criticisms of Joel B. Dirlamn, Department of
Economics, Connecticut College for Women.
1. In Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936), the Supreme Court
reversed the apparent tendency of Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 283 U.S. 344
(1933), to apply the rule of reason even to price-fixing associations. The change in the
application of the rule of reason to § 2 "monopolies" did not come until the AIlcea case,
note IS infra.
2. See, e.g., Vatldns, Business and the Low in RrawNsxs IN THE:SOZCAL COxTOL 0
INDusTpY 48 et seq. (1942) ; 'Mason, Monopoly in Law and Econotnies in id. at 25, 23-9,37-41, 44-7.
3. For an early and approving recognition of some of these tendencies, see Rostow,
The New Shenna Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 U. or CHI. L Rsv. 5567
(1947) ; Rostow, Monopoly Under the Sherman Act: Power or Purpose?, 43 ILL. L. Ru'.
745 (1949).
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the offending concerns, usually big and powerful sellers, have excluded or
disadvantaged smaller competitors. 4
Concomitant with these recent legal developments, academic economists
have unleashed a "new criticism" of the antitrust laws. These "new critics"
do not deny that the recent legal developments have made it easier for the
antitrust authorities to win cases. But they question, with increasing boldness,
whether the developments have not contravened rather than promoted the
basic purpose of the laws.5 They point out that big business is not just an
inevitable evil but a necessary agent of effective competition in modern in-
dustrial society.( A firm may emerge with a large share of the market because of
its superior efficiency and enterprise. In the same way, exclusive dealing and
full requirements contracts may be indispensable instruments or methods of
competing under modern conditions. They contend, therefore, that the Su-
preme Court was on firm economic ground in the 1920's when it held, under
the rule of reason, that business size and market power were not in themselves
offensive; that the Clayton Act was justified in condemning the enumerated
practices only if their "effect may be to substantially lessen competition" ;7
and that the recent dilutions of these escape clauses have paradoxically per-
mitted the authorities to harass enterprising big businesses in order to protect
small and inefficient competitors, thus discouraging competition itself. These
critics propose that the rule of reason be restored to its former vigor, and that
antitrust decisions depend henceforth on the impact of the disputed market
structures or practices on workable (as distinguished from pure or perfect)
4. For a detailed study of recent leading price discrimination cases, see Dirlam & Kahn,
Price Discrimination in Law and Economics, 11 Am. J. OF EcoN. & Soc. 281 (1952).
5. See, e.g., Adelman, Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 HARv. L. REv.
1289 (1.948) ; Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HARv. L. REv. 27 (1949).
6. See LILIENTHAL, BIG BusINEss, A NEW ERA (1953) ; Kaplan & Kahn, Biq Bnsiness
in a Competitive Society, 47 Fortune, February, 1953, § 2.
7. "Sec. 2(a). That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce .. . to
discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality
... where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly ... ." 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1946).
"Sec. 3. That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce . .. to lease
or make a sale or contract for sale or fix a price, charged therefor, or discount from, or
rebate upon, such price on the condition, agreement or understanding that the lessee or pur-
chaser... shall not use or deal in the goods... of a competitor or competitors of the lessor
or seller, where the effect ... may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create
a monopoly.. . ." 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1946).
"Sec. 7. That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire . . .the whole or any
part of the stock or other share capital or another corporation engaged also in commerce,
where effect of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition ... or tend to
create a monopoly. . . ." 38 STAT. 731. (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1946). Section 7 has since
been amended to embrace the acquisition of assets as well. 64 STAT. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C.
§ 18 (Supp. 1952). See Note, 63 YALE L.J. 233 (1953).
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competition,8 measured in terms either of concrete economic results or of the
continuing vitality of competitive forces in the market as a whole.0
In appraising these criticisms, this article examines the recent antitrust
decisions in a legal and economic context. The significant legal question is to
what extent the traditional rule of reason has in fact been abandoned. The
crucial economic question is whether the decisions have, as has been so often
alleged, made for less effective competition. The article focuses on the recent
antitrust cases involving business size and integration, and includes v.ithin its
compass integration not only by financial control, but also by means of tie-ins,
exclusive dealing, and full requirements contracts. All of these practices
represent methods of obtaining or exercising some of the advantages conferred
by integration, and have similar effects on competition. Underlying the entire
discussion is the conviction that the legal criteria of unreasonable restraint
and monopoly are always dictated primarily by the mores of a free enterprise
society, rather than by the clear-cut requirements of optimum economic per-
formance.
BUSINESS SIZE AND INTEGRATION IN MONOPOLY CASES
The Sherman Act was not intended to attack the mere enjoyment of mon-
opoly power. Rather, the stigma of "monopolizing"10 has attached, tradition-
S. As economists have come to recognize that pure or perfect competition are neither
practically attainable nor even desirable, they have in recent years embraced the alternative
standard, falling somewhere between pure competition and pure munopoly, as the appro-
priate guide to public policy. The concept of workable or effective competition is neces-
sarily imprecise and controversial However, its various definitions usually include the
presence of sufficiently intense rivalry among a sufficient number of sellers to offer buyers
a reasonable number of competing alternative sources of supply and thus hold monopoly
power in check; and the presence of sufficient elements of monopoly power to prevent cut-
throat competition, to assure technological progress, and to permit sellers to achieve the
technological efficiencies of size. Economists differ in the extent to which they would
look primarily to an industry's structure, or to the behavior of the firms in it, or to its
actual economic results to see whether it deserves approval as workably competitive, i.e., as
containing the best attainable balance of monopolistic and compLtitive elements. See sources
cited notes 5 and 6 supra, 9 and 26 infra.
9. See GRuwx', AN Ecoxomlc APPROACH To ANTIR'UST PRoBLEMS (1951); Busi-
NESs ADvIsoRy CouxcIL, REP. TO THE: Szc'v oF ComimsrmCr: EFFcrvE CowaZrnrox
(1952) ; Oppenheim, Federal Antitrst Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Anti-
trust Policy, 50 MicH. L. REv. 1139 (1952).
In Kahn, Standards for Antitrust Policy, 67 Hnv. L Rzv. 23 (1953), the author de-
scribed and appraised the possible alternative economic criteria of monopoly and monopo-
lizing.
10. "Sec. 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or com-
merce among the several States... shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor... ." 26 STAT.
209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §2 (1946).
The word "monopolize" does not appear in § 1 of the Sherman Act: "Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or corn-
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ally, to the unreasonable acts incident to attempts to acquire or maintain sub-
stantial monopoly power." Indeed, the American Can,'1 2 United Shoe Ma-
chinery,1 3 U.S. Steel,14 and International Harvester 15 decisions all seemed
to argue that even dominant firms-the result of mergers whose purpose was
virtually to eradicate competition in their respective industries--could not be
condemned or dissolved, if they had not achieved almost complete monopoly,
and had not employed flagrantly oppressive competitive methods.' 0 Recently,
the courts have gone far to reverse this earlier attitude, and have applied
Section 2 of the Sherman Act 17 to monopolists whose actions were not found
to be unreasonable or motivated by a clear intent to monopolize; oligopolists
(a few dominant sellers), without clear evidence of collusion between them;
integrated companies that excluded competitors merely from the patronage of
their own integrated subsidiaries or of customers with whom the integrated
companies had signed full requirements contracts; "hard bargainers" that
enjoyed little monopoly power but undoubtedly enjoyed some strategic ad-
vantages over their smaller, non-integrated rivals.
"Monopolizing" as the Enjoyment of a Monopoly
The Alcoa and United Shoe Machinery decisions:
The beginnings of the "new" Sherman Act are customarily traced to Judge
Hand's decision in the Alcoa case.' 8 After resolving the complex issue of
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal...
26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1946). However, under the rule of reason enunciated
in the Standard Oil case, note 24 infra, an important test of illegal "intent to monopolize,"
under § 2, was the accomplishment of an unreasonable restraint in contravention of § 1.
Similarly the American Tobacco decision of 1946, note 63 inra, found, in a price-fixing
conspiracy illegal under § 1, part of the evidence sustaining a charge of "monopolization"
as well, even though three separate companies were involved.
11. "In answer to the specific question whether an enterprise would be considered a
monopoly if, because of superior skill, it alone received all the orders for a particular article,
Senator Hoar replied, 'The word "monopoly" . . . [means] the sole engrossing to a man's
self by means which prevent other men from engaging in fair comnpelilion with him.;"
Mason, supra note 2, at 41.
12. United States v. American Can Co., 230 Fed. 859 (D. Md. 1916), decree denying
dissolution, 234 Fed. 1019 (D. Md. 1916).
13. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 247 U.S. 32 (1918).
14. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
15. United States v. Int'l Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927).
16. In United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26 (1920), the Supreme Court found
illegal monopolization under § 2, as well as unreasonable restraint of trade under § 1, even
though the defendants controlled only about one-third of the nation's production of anthra-
cite coal. To some extent, this decision conflicted with United States v. U.S. Steel Corp.,
251 U.S. 417 (1920). Three of the four members of the U.S. Steel majority dissented in
Reading. However, certainly another important reason for the decision in Reading was
the Court's finding of a clear-cut intent to monopolize in the long history of the defendant
companies.
17. See note 10 supra.
18. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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how best to measure the company's share in the national aluminum market
by selecting the combination of figures that yielded the highest possible per-
centage, Hand stated that Alcoa's ninety percent control "is enough to con-
stitute a monopoly," and that "having proved that 'Alcoa' had a monopoly...
the plaintiff had gone far enough."' 9 His opinion paid its respects to the
traditional doctrine that mere size is no offense, and accepted the necessity for
considering the mitigating if not exonerating possibility that monopoly might
have been "thrust upon" the company.20 But Hand met this hurdle merely
by stating that no one attains 100 percent control of domestic production
unwittingly, and by offering in evidence the fact that Alcoa, in steadfastly
increasing its capacity to meet all demands, "effectively anticipated and fore-
stalled all competition." 2' 1 Although used to show illegal intent, such evidence
could also show forthrightly competitive conduct. If these actions were repre-
hensible, it was only on the ground that the outcome, the monopoly position,
was itself illegal.
22
The basis on which Judge Hand chose to condemn Alcoa represented a sub-
stantial departure from the traditional rule of reason and its conception of
monopolizing. One might argue that Alcoa was not particularly novel, since
previous decisions exonerating big business defendants were heavily influenced
by the fact that the defendants were not pure monopolists.2 3 But in previous
decisions, the defendants had originally been put together by mammoth merg-
ers that left them with preponderant shares of total national production. Had
they retained those market positions, the courts would have been justified in
condemning them for monopolizing, "not as a result of normal methods uf
industrial development, but by new means... resorted to in order that greater
power might be added than would otherwise have arisen had normal methods
been followed.... 2 Judge Hand's decision, on the other hand, seemed to
19. Id. at 424,427.
20. "[T]he successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned
upon when he wins." Id. at 430.
21. Id. at 430-1.
22. "No intent is relevant except... [the] intent to bring about the forbidden act."
Id. at 432. But the "act" was the enjoyment of 90% of the market. See Adams, The
Alumnion Case: Legal Victory-Econownic Defeat, 41 A. Eco.N. REv. 917 (1951).
There is a clear implication of the same attitude in the earlier Pulltnan case. In effect,
Judge Goodrich said that a monopoly is a monopoly, and that the problem of drawing the
line under the rule of reason enters somewhere below 100% market control. United States
v. Pullman Co., 50 F. Supp. 123, 134-5 (E.D. Pa. 1943). In his appraisal, however, he in-
sisted on looking "at the whole picture." Id. at 133. And in this picture was a conscious
purposeful program for obtaining and then cementing this monopoly control by mergers,
exclusive agreements, and the like.
23. "[T]he corporation did not achieve monopoly... and it is against monopoly that
the statute is directed!' United States v. U. S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 444 (1920). See
also cases cited in notes 12 and 15 supra.
24. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 75 (1911). This was Chief Justice
White's historic enunciation of the rule of reason.
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define monopolizing as the mere enjoyment of monopoly, even if attained
entirely as a result of efficiency, foresight and technological innovations.
But Alcoa is not as revolutionary as it seems. Its condemnation of monopo-
lies as such is explicitly confined to classic, single-firm monopolies.20 Profes-
sor Mason criticizes Hand's measures of Alcoa's market position-both the
particular divisor and dividend that yielded the ninety percent quotient, and
the identification of market control with percentage shares in a given product
-as "very dubious economics." 2 The criticism is partially justified, since the
ninety percent figure ignored the competition between Alcoa's virgin ingot and
secondary aluminum, as well as other metals. But significantly, Mason offers
no better economic measure. None is available. The figure of ninety percent
was as indicative as any other of the unquestionable fact that one company
had a very substantial range of discretion in the pricing and the rate of de-
velopment of an entire industry.27
Another and more important reason for questioning the revolutionary
character of the Alcoa and later United Shoe Machinery 28 decisions is that
the defendants had monopolized their respective markets in the traditional
sense as well. Although emphasizing United Shoe Machinery's eighty-five
percent market share, Judge Wyzanski plainly predicated his condemnation
of the company on his finding that it had not attained and maintained its over-
whelming strength solely by virtue of its "ability, economics of scale, research,
natural advantages, and adaptation to inevitable economic laws. '2 Rather,
United Shoe Machinery's business policies, i.e., its actions, while not inherent-
ly predatory or immoral, had erected arbitrary barriers to competition.A0
Judge Hand could have reached the same conclusion in Alcoa. It should
not have been necessary to find a precise measure of Alcoa's market power
in order to convict it under the antitrust laws. The economic assumption of
those laws is that vigorous, fair competition in finding and satisfying customers
will not result in a monopoly. The history of the aluminum industry, of the
25. See 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945).
26. Mason, The Current Status of the Monopoly Problem in the United Slates, 62
HARv. L. REv. 1265, 1273-4 (1949).
27. No monopolist has a completely inelastic demand, except within extremely narrow
limits. Except for imports, which were included in Hand's computation, Alcoa had the
primary power to determine how rapidly aluminum made its way in competition with other
metals. On the relative acceptability of secondary ingot, see 148 F.2d 416, 423-4 (2d Cir.
1945); MULLER, LIGHT METALS MONOPLY 21, c, 1, passim (1946). Wallace says that
scrap falls short in essential respects of completely preventing the exercise of monopoly
power by producers of the primary metal. Wallace, Aluminun in INTERNATIONAL CONT L
IN THE NoN-FERROUS METALS 210, 258 n.87 (Elliott ed. 1937) (hereinafter cited as ELLIOTT).
28. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953).
29. Id. at 343.
30. "They are contracts, arrangements, and policies which ... further the dominance
of a particular firm. In this sense, they are unnatural barriers; they unnecessarily exclude
actual and potential competition; they restrict a free market." Id. at 344-5.
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ways in which Alcoa obtained, retained, and used its market power, does not
disprove this assumption.31 Alcoa might have enjoyed its predominant posi-
tion in the American market in 1944 without having bought out the Cowles
Brothers and the critical Bradley patent in 1903 ;a2 without the expressly ex-
clusive clauses in its bauxite and power purchase contracts, annulled by a 1912
consent decree ;33 without the acquisition of at least one imminently threatening
domestic competitor in the 1920's, the squeeze on fabricators, 4 and the direct
and indirect understandings with foreign producers,33 including the strangely
cooperative "competitor" Southern Aluminum Company. Its head start and
advantages of "experience, trade connections, and elite of personnel"303 might
alone have sufficed to discourage or destroy competitors. Neither an econo-
mist nor a lawyer can be sure. But in fact these actions provided ample evi-
dence to support a finding of an intent to monopolize-to keep the American
aluminum market Alcoa's exclusive preserve by whatever methods were
required.37
Although Judge Hand's virtual per se condemnation of Alcoa as a mon-
opolist did not extend to the company's vertical integration, perhaps it should
have. A strong case can be made for the condemnation of the market struc-
ture here. Alcoa tied together a domestic monopoly in aluminum, protected
for a time by patents, with control of extensive bauxite deposits and power
sites, and with large operations in the more competitive field of fabrication.
31, Nor does the history of the Pullman Company. See supra note 22.
32. The keen competition between Alcoa's predecessor and the Cowles Brothers
between 1887 and 1893 vras in large measure responsible for the price reduction of
aluminum from $5.00 to $0.75 a pound in these six years. The Cowles Brothers went
out of the business in 1893, when Alcoa's predecessor company launched and won an
initial victory in a patent infringement suit; they stayed out even though their own
patent was upheld in 1903, selling out to Alcoa for $1,429,000 and annual royalties.
See WI.VAAcE, MARKEr CONTROL IN THE AL. .iNIm I DutsTRY 101 (1937) ; STocKING &
WVATKiNs, CARTE.s ix AcnoN 221-2 (1946).
"Had patent protection ended in 1906 it is highly improbable that the Aluminum Com-
pany would have attained by that time the degree of size, integration, and power which,
after the intervening boom years, faced potential competitors in 1909 .... E.'ension of
patent protection to twenty years [by acquisition of the Bradley patent] destroyed the
opportunity for competitors to enter at a period when conditions were perhaps more
favorable than they have ever been since." VALUACE, op. cit. Supra, at 101.
33. United States. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 1 DEauEs & JtUI;UMENTs 341
(M.D. Pa. 1912) (consent decree entered).
34. See 148 F.2d 416, 436-8 (2d Cir. 1945); WAu.CE, op. cit. supra note 32, at
380-92.
35. See STOCKING & WATKINS, op. cit. supra note 32, at 224-73.
36. 148 F.2d 416, 431 (2d Cir. 1945).
37. See, e.g., MULLER, op. cit. smtpra note 27, cc. 2-6. In view of this record of
Alcoa's conduct, it is difficult to take seriously the contention of one commentator that
Alcoa's monopoly position was a simple and inevitable consequence of today's "monster
technology" and of its success in the competitive struggle. Levitt, The Dilcr;m:a of
Antitrust Aims: Commwnt, 42 Am. EcoN. REv. 893 (1952).
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These tie-ins, whether accomplished by exclusive purchase contracts or by
financial integration, unquestionably made it more difficult for competitors to
engage in the production of ingot. And they exposed fabricators to a squeeze,
either because of their inability to command adequate supplies of ingot in time
of shortage, or as a result of Alcoa's narrowing the margin between its ingot
and product prices.3 8 In either event, monopoly positions at certain levels
reinforced monopoly power at other levels.
The district court's view of the law was that proof of a specific intent to
monopolize was necessary to convict Alcoa. The trial judge found not illegal
intent but merely prudent business motivations in Alcoa's accumulation and
exercise of the competitive advantages that flowed from its vertical integra-
tion.39 Judge Hand did not reverse this finding as "clearly erroneous,"4 0
except to hold that the price squeeze on rolling mills was prima facie evidence
of illegal intent.41 Even the price squeeze, however, did not necessarily evince
a specific intent to injure or to exclude, since it represented, in part, a means
of probing the opportunities for increasing the use of aluminum sheet in
competition with other metals-a kind of promotional price discrimination.
42
An economist might reasonably contend that an inquiry into Alcoa's intent
was not worthwhile. Alcoa's vertical integration imposed severe and entirely
strategic handicaps upon non-integrated competitors, and erected substantial
barriers against competitive entry.43 The fact of market power alone, it might
reasonably be argued, was significant. Given the market structure in alum-
inum, perhaps the vertical integration itself should have been held objectionable.
However, it was not necessary for the law to go to either extreme: condemn-
ing Alcoa's vertical integration per se, or condemning it contingent upon a
38. The two kinds of squeeze are in some measure alternatives. In the late 1920's and
early 1930's ingot production was the profitable operation, and it was the price squeeze
which forced sheet rollers to close down. In the recent defense boom, the low price of
aluminum relative to the costs of new construction and additional power apparently
made reduction less ,profitable than fabrication; but for that very reason, integrated
producers were reluctant to sell, and non-integrated fabricators could not get the
ingot to take advantage of the wide margins. See ANDERSON, ALUMINUM FOR DErEcE
AND PRosPERIrY 22-3 (1951) ; H.R. REP'. No. 255, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 5, 7, 22 (1951)
(Celler Subcommittee on Monopoly Power: Aluminum).
39. 44 F. Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). The company's vertical integration did repre-
sent in large measure a socially beneficial exercise of competitive foresight and initiative
in exploring and developing new sources of supply, in uncovering and exploiting new
uses for aluminum.
40. 148 F.2d 416, 434 (2d Cir. 1945).
41. Id. at 437-8.
42. WALLACE, op. cit. supra note 32, at 390-5. Was it evidence of predatory intent
when Alcoa officials pointed out to two utensil manufacturers contemplating construction
of their own rolling mills that future ingot shortages would naturally shut down their
projected mills before Alcoa's own? See id. at 437-40, 374-9, and c. 18, passimn.
43. Compare Adelman's analysis: "The vice of integration, therefore, is its superior
efficiency, for that makes it impossible for nonintegrated concerns to be 'able to com-
pete.' " Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HARV. L. Rzv. 27, 53 (1949).
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demonstration of predatory intent. The decision could have hinged on the
traditional test of monopolization, the evidence of what the defendant did.
Alcoa had the power to exclude. It maintained the power in part at least by
methods other than those of normal competition. It e.ercised the power,
with the result that actual and potential competitors were seriously squeezed.
Because exclusion was the consequence not merely of its market power
and structure but of its policies, an intent to monopolize might reasonably
have been inferred. The test of intent is not a test of the purity of a company's
motives, but an evaluation of its conduct.4 4 A company in Alcoa's position
in ingot cannot be permitted to reduce prices sdelctivly in such a way as to
wipe out the profit margins of those who must buy from it as well as sell in
competition with it. Nor can it be permitted, without limit, to extend its
monopoly by such means as Alcoa employed.
Alcoa and the requirements of workable competition:
In determining whether or not the Alcoa decision violated the requirements
of workable competition, the market performance of the industry, under the
competitive stimulus of scrap, imports, and other metals, must be examined.
While it is impossible to assess the complicated record with any pretension
to scientific accuracy,45 Alcoa must unquestionably receive substantial credit
for the rapid growth of the American aluminum industry, for the dramatic
secular decline in prices and costs, and the corresponding expansion of
capacity and in the uses of aluminum."0 But it is certainly doubtful that a
complete monopoly of American ingot production was a necessary cundition
of this development. Economies of large-scale operation in production and
research did not require a single producer 47 Moreover, one cautious and
diffident appraisal concluded that the single seller was responsible for some
substantial restriction of output and investment and that an oligopoly would
probably have done better.48 The pressure of a few competitors would
probably have remedied the particularly flagrant lag of investment behind
rising demand in the boom years 1900-07 and 1923-26. Even the expansions
during the periods 1908-14, 1926-29, and 1935-39 probably fell short of not only
the ideal but also the attainable.40 And in both the 1907 and 1929 depressions,
"lower prices would have enabled much better utilization of capacity with-
out bringing losses."' 0 Moreover, the successful demand for an increase in the
44. See Kahn, supra note 9, at 50-3.
45. W 1"ca, op. cit. supra note 32, at -xvii, --=L-. These disclaimers lend support
to my own arguments for rejecting an appraisal of market performance as a substantive
basis for antitrust judgments.
46. Id. at 10-16, 114, 152, 179-203, 254-7.
47. Id. at 189-203.
48. Id. at 331-66.
49. ELLIOTT 231, 254-7; WmA.ACE, op. cit. supra note 32, at 247-S; STocKING &
WATrIxS, op. cit. supra note 32, c. 6.
50. Er.uorT 231; WALLAcE, op. cit. supra note 32, at 28, c. 14.
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protective duty in 1922 (from 2c to 5c per lb., at which level it re-
mained until 1930), and the prompt elevation of the price by the same
amount, were surely evidence of unworkable competition.Y Alcoa's high
profits, particularly in the monopoly ingot field, are further evidence." Aver-
age overall annual returns of 9.63% on stockholders' equity during the decade
of the 1930's, 16.61 % in 1935-39, and 27% in 1939 alone, would appear to
vindicate the "dubious economics" of Judge Hand. Both economics and law
appear to agree, then, that the Alcoa decision was correct in giving the
Government the right to lay its hands on the aluminum industry.
The new market structure and prospects of better performance:
The decree in Alcoa53 and the Government's disposal of surplus World
War II plants to Reynolds and Kaiser have substantially altered the market
structure of the aluminum industry. There are now three large, vertically
integrated domestic producers of aluminum, instead of one. And there is
a huge potential competitor in Canada, enjoying unusually low costs, which
will in time have no ties to Alcoa. The American producers enjoy rights
under Alcoa's patents, and have been freed of the obligation to license that
company under any patents which they may develop in the future.
Although the structure is changed, the performance in the aluminum in-
dustry may not be drastically different, at least in certain important respects.
It seems clear, from the district court's exhaustive assessment, that Kaiser
and Reynolds are both weaker than Alcoa in financial strength, in cost of
production, in patents and research facilities. And, unfortunately, Alcoa may
51, The tariff might have been expected to encourage new domestic entrants, or at
least expansion of capacity by Alcoa. However, Alcoa effectively precluded the entry
of two major interests by buying them out-the Uihleins, who had secured control of
extensive bauxite deposits, and J. B. Duke, who had an excellent power site on the
Saguenay River and had made arrangements with George Haskell to go into the
aluminum business. WALLACE, op. cit. mipra note 32, at 129-35. Moreover, despite
severe shortages in the intervening years, Alcoa delayed beginning an expansion of
capacity until 1925. Nourse and Drury blame the price increases and shortages during
the early 1920's for the substantial retardation in the growth of demand for aluminum,
especially within the automobile industry. NOURSE & DRURY, INDUSTRIAL PRICE POLICIES
AND EcoNoMIC PROGRESS 203-08 (1938).
52. The rate of return in ingot production was "considerably higher" than in total
company operations. WALLACE, op. cit. supra note 32, at 30-1, 233, 250-2, 258-60, 263;
STOCKING & WATKINS, op. cit. supra note 32, at 231.
53. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America. 91 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
Judge Knox refused to break up Alcoa, because, the competitive position of Reynolds and
Kaiser appearing -reasonably secure, it no longer enjoyed a complete monopoly in virgin
aluminum, and also because of its excellent economic performance. Id. at 401, 416. Instead
he ordered (1) dissolution of the "community of interest" between Alcoa and Aluminum
Ltd. of Canada-"no matter how lawful the relations with Limited may have been
in the past," id. at 399-and (2) cancellation of the grant-back provisions in the patent
licenses which Alcoa had granted to its competitors. Finally, he retained jurisdiction for
an additional five years, to permit a later review of the efficacy of the decree.
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think twice before competing aggressively with the others, if in so doing it
stands a good chance of falling heir again to the monopoly which the court of
appeals condemned "out of Hand."'U4 In any event, three domestic sellers
are unlikely to engage in vigorous price competition in so standardized a
product as ingot. As for Aluminum, Ltd., of Canada, Congress is likely to
exert pressure to exclude its product in the interest of the new domestic
producers ;5 and in any event, Aluminum, Ltd., is unlikely to endanger Alcoa's
price leadership.rG On the contrary, its 1953 contract to supply Alcoa with
600,000 tons of ingot over the next six years tends to frustrate the antitrust
decree's purpose of bringing Aluminum, Ltd., into the American market as a
direct competitor.57
54. However, Judge Kno.x's opinion is reassuring on this score: "I hardly think...
that normal competitive activity can be used to show an inveterate purpose to dominate
an industry% ... Any such theory, in my judgment, might lead to the vengeful imposi-
tion of a penalty upon conduct that is compelled by law." Id. at 415.
55. See, e.g., Aluminum from Canada was frowned upon by Congress this weeh,
Business Week, July 5, 1952, p. 38. Compare the hostility toward relying on Canadian
ingot exhibited by the Celler Subcommittee, H.R. REP. No. 255, op. dt. mspra note 32, by
Adams, supra note 22, at 922, and by the Joint Committee on Defense Production in
Defense Production Act Progress, Report No. 20, SEN. REP. No. 1937, 82d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1952), with the convincing case on the other side made by A:.DZnsoN.-, op. cit.
supra note 38, at 8-9, 30-2, and by Congressman Celler himself, after changing his mind,
CELLERi, THE ALUMINU-M PROGMRA, AN ANA LYSIS OF THE REFORT OF T1lE JOI.T CO!,-
M'nTrEE ON DEFENSE PRODUcrMoN (privately printed 1952). See also testimony of repre-
sentatives of Reynolds and Kaiser before the Celler Comm. Hcarings before Stubcon:nittee
on the Study of 3Monopol, Power of the Committee on the Jdiciary, House of Repre-
sentatives, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. Ser. 1, pt. 1, 111-76, 263 (1951) (hereinafter cited as
Hearings).
56. Nathanial Davis, president of Aluminum Ltd., testified that his company would not
as a matter of policy undercut American prices, even if its costs were lower, for fear of pro-
vodng a rise in the United States tariff. H.R. REP. No. 255, op. cit. mipra note 33; Hear-
ings, Ser. 1, pt. 1,440,449-50.
However, the immediate need in aluminum ingot is apparently not for downward price
competition but for a price high enough to permit the required expansion of capacity in the
face of increasing costs of transporting bauxite from more distant sources, generating elec-
tric power, and constructing new facilities in an inflationary period. The price of ingot has
apparently been too low in recent years to permit private capital to construct additional
capacity for the purpose of selling it in the open market and a conservative retardation of
investment may occur under oligopoly as well as under monopoly:
"Mr. Halleck. It has been said to me that certain alleged monopolistic positions of some
of the larger aluminum-producing companies have intervened to interfere with the increas-
ing production of aluminum. Is that true or not?
"Mr. [Charles E.] Wilson. [then Director of Defense Mobilization] It was true; yes."
Joint Hearings before Committees on Banking and Currency and Select Cammnitiees on
Snall Business, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1951).
57. See Petition in Equity No. 85-73, United States v. Aluminum Co. of America
(S.D.N.Y. 1953). Alcoa replied that most American fabricators do not require ingot, but
need instead the semi-fabricated materials which Alcoa will now be able to supply them,
because of its contract with Aluminum Ltd. See Aicoa-Alcan Tie in Court, Business Wee:,
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However, these doubts about the future of the industry do not support
the claims of the critics of the "new" Sherman Act, that the law flouts the
requirements of workable competition. Most economists, including the pro-
ponents of workable competition, agree that four independent sellers and
potential innovators are better than one. The introduction of some uncertainty
about the division of the market, the likelihood of independent decision-
making and action with respect not so much to pricing as to research, in-
vestment, and product development surely diminishes the prospect of restric-
tionism in the long run. 8 The effect of the Alcoa decree is therefore likely
to be more, not less, effective competition.
The only supportable economic criticism of Alcoa is not that the decree went
too far, but that it did not go far enough. Competition in aluminum fabrication
is still burdened by the industry's tight vertical integration. The introduction
of two vertically integrated domestic producers has not greatly increased the
availability of ingot to independent fabricators; the latter continue to be de-
pendent upon their integrated competitors. The difficulties of the 17,000 inde-
pendent fabricators during the recent defense program add appeal to the
suggestion that Alcoa's fabrication and reduction facilities be separated."
The courts need not hesitate in splitting Alcoa along horizontal lines in 1954
merely because vertical integration has enabled the company in the past to press
forward the development of sources of raw material and power, and new fabri-
cating uses of aluminum. It might be possible to preserve the dynamic contri-
butions of vertical integration, and still dilute Alcoa's power and increase the
competitive opportunities of non-integrated fabricators. For example, all or
part of Alcoa's present fabrication activities could be split off, while permitting
the company to develop whatever new market outlets it chooses.°0 Vertical
integration is a threat to competition only where competition is seriously
imperfect in one of the interconnected horizontal strata."1  In alumi-
Aug. 22, 1953, pp. 88, 90. Alcoa ignored the contention of the Department of Justice that
Aluminum, Ltd., should compete with Alcoa, rather than enable the latter to retain its share
of the American market for semi-fabricated products.
58. See, e.g., Martin, The Dilemma of Antitrust Aims: Further Comment, 42 Am.
EcoN. REV. 900, 905 (1952).
59. See ANDERSON, op. cit. supra note 38; H.R. REP. No. 255, op. cit. supra note 38;
Hearings, Ser. 1, pt. 1; Martin, supra note 58, at 902 n.5; Comment, Vertical Integration in
Almninum: A Bar to 'Effective Competition', 60 YALE L.J. 294, 300, 304, 307, passimn (1951).
Also see Hearings before Senate Select Committee on Small Business on Material Short-
ages: Aluminum, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 4 (1951).
60. Adams makes exactly the opposite suggestion: "What the government should have
demanded as a minimum ... was that Alcoa be enjoined from any further vertical integration
-- especially in the fabrication field." Adams, supra note 22, at 919 n.8. His proposal ignores
the possible dynamic contributions of vertical extensions of company activities. It is in the
old fabrication fields that the social values of innovation through integration are most likely
to be outweighed by the drawbacks of Alcoa's static advantages over non-integrated com-
petitors.
61, See Hale, Vertical Integration, 49 COL. L. REv. 921, 937 et seq. (1949).
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num, the evil was Alcoa's monopoly of ingot. To the ex-tent that this monopoly
can be further dissipated, vertical integration, with its possible contributions to
efficiency and innovation, may be safely left undisturbed.
Unless integrated firms so dearly abuse the power conferred by control of
scarce materials that antitrust divestiture is justified, Government intervention
outside of the antitrust laws is probably the only possible way of attempting
to assure fairness in the distribution of such materials. Recent actions of the
Government offer the prospect of considerable relief along these lines. It has
been granting contracts for expansion of ingot capacity, contingent on the
reservation of a minimum portion of the forthcoming ingot for independent
fabricators. A long-term Government purchase contract with Aluminum, Ltd.,
would serve the same end. Even without further prosecution or a Government
purchase contract, independent aluminum fabricators in the United States can
probably look forward to reliable and increasing supplies from Aluminum,
Ltd., which needs their patronage and political support in contesting increased
duties on aluminum ingot, as much as they need its supplies.6
"Monopolizing" as Possession of the Power to Exclude
The Cigarette and Movie decisions:
The American Tobacco decision 3 strengthened the "new" Sherman Act's
flat prohibition of monopoly power. The Supreme Court upheld a finding of
conspiracy among three separate companies to ,fix prices and to monopolize,
even though the record contained no direct evidence of collusion." Also, the mere
joint possession by the "Big 3" in the tobacco industry of the power to exclude,
accompanied by a conspiratorial intent to use it, was declared illegal; evidence
of actual exclusion of competitors was unnecessary. There is strong reason to
believe that the rigid and non-competitive price leadership practiced by the
"Big 3" required no collusion, but followed naturally from an independent and
rational pursuit of individual, oligopolistic interests. Anmerican Tobacco seemed,
therefore, to go far in bringing normal oligopoly behavior, hence oligopoly
itself, within the compass of the antitrust laws.0 3
62. See, e.g., Aid for Fabricators Here, N.Y. Times, May 22, 1953, p. 36, col. 5. How-
ever, it will probably help if the Government succeeds in rescinding the contract between
Aluminum, Ltd., and Alcoa. See note 57 szpra.
63. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
64. The acceptability of a conviction for conspiratorial price-fixing inferred from the
pursuit of uniform price policies was sustained again in United States %. Paramount Pic-
tures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 142 (1948). The doctrine of "conscious parallelism" was most
fully and explicitly developed in Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. FTC, 16S F.2d 175, 181
(7th Cir. 1948), aff'd sub nor. by an "veny divided court, Clayton Mark & Co. v. FTC,
336 U.S. 956 (1949).
65. See NICHOLLS, PRIcE POLICIES IN THE CIGARETTE INDUsTRY 172,24, 352-403 (1951).
Some commentators have also found in American Tobacco a forthright condemnation of
non-collusive power to fix prices, but this interpretation is unjustified. See Kahn, supra
note 9, at 31-2.
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This development was extended in the movie decisions of 1948. In the
Griffith case,60 the chain embraced theatres in both one-theater and multi-
theater towns, and bargained with distributors for exhibition rights in all
theaters as a group. Griffith used the leverage of local monopolies in one-
theater towns, where the distributor had to offer his pictures to Griffith if
he was to have an audience at all, to obtain vital competitive advantages in the
other towns. Among the valuable privileges obtained in this fashion were the
rights of pre-emption in selecting films and long clearances over competitors.
The Supreme Court held that such a situation conferred monopoly power; and,
citing the Alcoa doctrine that "no monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what
he is doing,"0' 7 it found, in the ways in which the chain bargained, abuse of that
power sufficient to meet the test of the Tobacco case." Thus, the Court came
close to condemning, per se, integration embracing a monopoly market. The
situation need only confer a strategic advantage over competitors, and the
leverage need only be employed. Integration almost inevitably confers such
an advantage over non-integrated competitors in one or another of the markets
in which the integrated firm operates. 0
In the Paramount case,70 as in Alcoa and Griffith, the court of final jurisdic-
tion was forced to resort to market structure arguments in the face of certain
negative findings of fact by the district court.71 The district court had
found that the five major producers had neither enjoyed nor sought, indi-
vidually or collectively, a "national monopoly in exhibition. '7 2 The Supreme
Court focused, instead, on the market that the "Big 5" unquestionably monopo-
lized-the first run field or "cream of the exhibition business" 7 8-and on
the inherent advantages in access to first runs enjoyed by the exhibition houses
of the vertically integrated producers.7 4 The Court followed the Griffith doc-
trine that a "specific intent" to monopolize need not be proven "if monopoly
results as a necessary consequence of what was done."'7 5 It therefore set aside
the lower court's exculpation of the defendants, and granted the divestiture
remedy.7"
66. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
67. Id. at 105.
68. "It is... not always necessary to find a specific intent to restrain trade or to build
a monopoly .... It is sufficient that a restraint of trade or monopoly results as the con-
sequence of a defendant's conduct or business arrangements." Ibid.
69. See Kahn, supra note 9, at 43-6; Rostow, Problems of Size and Integration in
BUSINESS PRACTICES UNDER FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 122 (1952) (hereinafter cited as
1951 SymPosiumI).
70. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
71. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 53, 54-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1,946);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 44 F. Supp. 97, 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) ; United
States v. Griffith Amusement Co., 68 F. Supp. 180, 182-6 (W.D. Okla. 1946).
72. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 168 (1948).
73. Id. at 172-3.
74. Id. at 172, 174.
75. Id. at 173.
76. Id. at 174.
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Although the cigarette and movie decisions unquestionably strengthened the
antitrust laws, their novelty has been exaggerated. First, strong circum-
stantial evidence indicated that the defendants in American Tobacco and Para-
mount had in effect agreed to eradicate price competition among themselves.
Apart from the absence of direct evidence, the decisions on this score repre-
sented no advance over Trenton Potteries 7 or Socony-Vacuum.i s8 Second, the
Tobacco decision did not authorize attacks on the unexercised power to ex-
clude. The Court said the Government had to prove tlat the companies had
conspired to obtain and maintain the power to exclude competitors and had
demonstrated an intent to use it.70 Since such an intent can be shown only by
actual abuse of the power, the Court summarized the evidence of the exclusive
tactics of the cigarette companies, which established the requisite intent to
drive out competitorsSO
The movie cases of 1948 were even more replete with extreme competitive
disadvantages imposed upon independents not only by the structure but also by
the actions of the defendants. In Paramount, the Court held the five vertically
integrated producers guilty of collaborative monopolization on the basis of a
lengthy record of unreasonable clearances, pooling agreements, formula deals,
master agreements, block booking, and discrimination, all at the expense of
unaffiliated theaters. In Griffith, it found monopsony power exerted to obtain
77. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., -73 U.S. 392 (1927).
78. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). One could enplain
each item of circumstantial evidence in the Tobacco case in terms of an independent recog-
nition and scrupulous pursuit of oligopolistic self-interest. Yet, the course of conduct was
so punctilious that to draw the line between such oligopolistic behavior and collusion would
be entirely academic from the economic viewpoint. Witness the conscientious refusal of
each of the "Big 3" to enter any tobacco market unless the others were represented, or to
fill any orders at its unchanged and still nominally prevailing price the instant the leader
announced an increase; witness their systematic policing of retail prices to avoid any discrep-
ancies between the prices of their respective products in eithcr direction. See Nxcuou.s,
op. cit. supra note 65, at 399; STOCKING & WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND Fnan ETEf MEIS
136-66 (1951). But see, BAum, WoRmKr~a CoUxPTITION IN TaHE Tom=cco INDusntv cc.
3-7 (unpublished dissertation, Harvard University, 1949). Baum demonstrates that much
of the Government's evidence of "conspiracy" was extremely feeble.
79. 328U.S. 781,809,811 (1946).
So. Id. at 803-04, 806-08. This evidence too is not entirely convincing. The alleged
manipulation of the price of low grade tobacco leaf in order to squeeze the cheaper brands
was insufficiently demonstrated. NIcHoLLs, op. cit. supra note 65, at 323-36; BAuM,, op. cit.
supra note 78, at 168-74. The Court's condemnation of the drastic price reductions of early
1933 on the ground that they had been "directed at the competition of the 10-cent ciga-
rettes" was also questionable. However, the conclusion that these cuts were predatory in
character can be evaluated only in the context of the case: the flagrant price rises of mid-
1931, the pressure on retailers to keep the differential between major and economy brands
down to 3 cents, and the simultaneous increase in prices only when the interlopers had been
cut back to size. Only a consideration of intent can fulfill the inescapable function of dif-
ferentiating vigorous price competition from predatory price cutting in quest of monopoly.
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unfair competitive advantages, at the expense of exhibitors whose deficiency
was one of bargaining power only."' It did not strike at business arrange-
ments that have the merely incidental consequence of excluding competitors from
some area of the market. It rejected the Government's claim that vertical
integration in the motion picture industry was inherently objectionable.8 2 The
inescapable monopoly power of a movie house in a one-theater town was held not
in itself to violate the law. 3 Power over price was condemned only if it was
the product of collusion, and the power to exclude only after a showing that
the defendants had actually exerted it.
8 4
The evil in both cigarettes and movies, then, was market power manifested
in so clearly non-competitive a pattern of pricing as strongly to suggest con-
spiracy; vertical integration so clearly manifesting a struggle for monopolistic
advantage, 5 and market leverage so flagrantly exerted to impose unreason-
able injury on competitors, as to justify condemnation for monopolizing.
The economics of the cigarette and movie decisions:
A convincing argument can surely be made, with respect to both the Tobacco
and Paramount cases, that the oligopolistic character of the markets to-
gether with the commanding power and strategic advantages of the defend-
ants, were the appropriate grounds for the suit and should have sufficed to
convict.86 In the cigarette industry, this market structure produced results
about which no economist seems to have anything good to say.81 In movies,
the severe imperfections of competition in both production and exhibition, re-
sulting from fewness of sellers, the uniqueness of each product, and the mo-
nopoly power issuing from favorable location of theaters, suggest a particular
threat to competition in permitting oligopolists to operate at both levels. In
these circumstances, vertical integration inevitably reinforced the monopoly
elements by increasing the impediments to entry at both levels, and engendered
81. See, e.g., What's Playing at the Grove?, 38 Fortune, August, 1948, pp. 95-8.
82. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 173-4 (1948).
83. See United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 106 (1948). Compare this dictum with
Adelman's statement, in support of which he cites this same case: "It is now established
doctrine that 'unreasonable' control over any local market, or any significant area of
interstate commerce, is illegal." Adelman, Integration and Antitru.st Policy, 63 HAv. L.
Rxv. 27, 48 (1949).
84. See Fuchs, Economic Conwiderations in the Enforcement of the Atniitrust Laws of
the United States, 34 MINN. L. R~v. 210,226,229 (1950).
85. LUTHER, THE MorIoN PIcTURE INDUSTRY 38, 39 (unpublished dissertation, Univ.
of Minnesota, 1949).
86. See BAUM, op. cit. supra note 78, passim.
87. See, e.g., id. c. 6; KAPLAN, BIG BusiNEss IN A ComP EIE SYsTEm c. 5, 24-5, c. 6,
19-20 (unpublished ms., Brookings Inst., 1952) ; Nic0oLLs, op. cit. supra note 65, at 401;
Markham, The Nature and Significance of Price Leadership, 41 Am. EcoN. REv. 891, 903-05
(1951) ; Mason, supra note 2, at 1275. See the more qualified verdict of Tennant, The
Cigarette Industry in THE STRiucPuRE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY 257-65 (Adams ed. 1950).
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the rigidly channelized, essentially cooperative kind of competition that pre-
vailed between the majors.,s
Even in these cases, however, it would have been dangerous to condemn the
defendants merely because they were few, or few and vertically integrated,
or enjoyed monopoly power.8 9 Their small number might have mirrored the
survival of the fittest, the economies of scale, and the limitations of the market.
As for condemning vertical integration per se, this form of business integration
undoubtedly made a dynamic contribution. The leading producers had a
particular incentive to make huge investments in the construction of new
theaters, equipped for "talkies"; they %wanted the widest possible audience for
their films. 0 They claimed that the resultant assurance of wide distribution
and exhibition in turn justified the heavy investments required to produce
modern "A" films. 91
And in the movie cases, at least, it would have been equally undesirable to
try to evaluate economic performance9 2  A court should not be asked to
decide, in an antitrust proceeding against movie companies, whether or not the
88. See Hellmuth, The Motion Picture Industry in THE: Smucrurm or Aammncam.
IxDusTRY c. 8 (Adams ed. 1951).
If this analysis is valid, it gives little comfort to the "new critics" of antitrust laws.
Where oligopolists are so punctilious in avoiding effective competition as to run afoul of the
Socony-Vacuum precedent of "conscious parallelism," see note 78 supra, the economist can
hardly complain that the antitrust laws are condemning "hard" and encouraging "soft"
competition.
89. See Kahn, supra note 9, at 33-7, 46-7.
90. Hale, supra note 61, at 934 n.85. On the other hand, as in the case of Alcoa, while
such dynamic contributions militate against any blanket prohibitions of vertical integration,
they do not necessarily vindicate past integration which has made its contribution and now
confers excessive market leverage. See p. 304 supra.
91. See LuTHER, op. cit. supra note 85, at 164; Helmuth, supra note 8, at 289-90.
Neither writer fully accepts this argument; nor do I. "[I]t is fair to say that the producer-
exhibitor divorce led straight to the present trend in movie-making-fewer productions, but
huger ones, more expensive, and of higher quality." A Turn for the Bigger, Business Wee:,
Nov. 14, 1953, p. 146. But the judgment in each case stems largely from the opinion that
heavy investments to produce films for guaranteed markets does not necessarily make for
the best product. And an essential part of the argument here is that value judgments about
the quality of product are not suitable criteria for antitrust decisions.
92. Adelman criticizes the courts for failing to consider "the adverse effect on the
movie-going public' of the monopoly power enjoyed by the Schine chain of theaters. Schine
Chain Theaters v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948). Yet his own brief evaluation sug-
gests the futility of such an investigation: "Schine's power ... enabled it to disregard...
the demands of the distributors for price maintenance. The public benefits of competition
enforced by the big buyer might very plausibly have been called transitory and therefore
no offset to the larger drawback of local monopoly. The important thing is that they were
never considered." Adelman, Effectiv'e Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 I-Lnv. L
REv. 1289, 1319 (1948). The courts were right not to consider them. They might have
made the gesture of supplying plausible economic considerations of the foregoing type, but
the results could scarcely have been any more decisive than is the result of Adelman's own
brief attempt persuasive.
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quality and price of the extraordinarily variegated composite service in quest-
tion, or the past or prospective contributions to that record of the particular
restraints at issue, merit condemnation. Nor, as it would have to do in
appraising the price record of the industry, should any Government agency
decide whether or not the "stars" or motion picture executives deserve their
extraordinary salaries and bonuses.
Although it is extremely difficult to predict the impact of the cigarette and
movie decisions on the economic performance of the industries concerned, the
change is certainly for the better. To the extent that the movie decrees are
effective in improving the competitive opportunities of independent producers
and exhibitors, they can only contribute at both levels to a greater ease of
entry, which is the prime requisite of workable competition. The divorce of
production and exhibition should make it more difficult for the producers to
avoid price competition down the line. Breaking up the big theater chains
may diminish their "countervailing power," and so incur the censure of Pro-
fessor Galbraith,93 but there is no evidence that the chains used this power
in any other way than to get monopolistic preferences for themselves. The
cigarette companies, on the other hand, have only the implicit injunction not
to do those imprecisely identifiable things which caused the jury to find them
guilty. Yet even such a rule may 'be to some extent salutary. The conviction
has apparently helped to engender a more moderate pricing policy.9 4 If the
"Big 3" cannot be forced to compete, at least they can be discouraged from
extortionate pricing under rigid price leadership.
The major impediments to entry and effective competition in cigarettes are
not the threat of exclusionary tactics--about which the "Big 3" will presum-
ably be more circumspect in the future-but rather the immense cost of ad-
vertising, consumer acceptance of the familiar brands, and the regressive fed-
eral excise tax.95 The antitrust laws alone cannot eradicate all these influences.
But they can do much even here. The Supreme Court has already taken
cognizance of the fact that heavy advertising expenditures represent a sub-
stantial bulwark of the "Big 3's" monopoly power.9 6 In line with past decrees
93. Galbraith's thesis is that the primary protection of consumers in the American
economy today is not competition among sellers, but the power of organized buyers, e.g.,
mail order houses and chain stores, which opposes that of monopolistic sellers. GALBRAITH,
AMERICAN CAPITALISM, THE CO NCEP' OF COUNTERVAILING POWER (1952).
94. NICHOLLS, op. cit. supra note 65, at 164-6; Tennant, supra note 87, at 255.
95. Suppose one manufacturer is willing to get a net price of 4 cents a pack, while
another charges 7 cents, or 75% more. Addition of a flat federal excise of 7 cents, without
the other equally rigid local taxes and distribution costs, raises the price of the cheaper
brand 175%, of the more expensive one only 100%, and reduces the price discrepancy
sharply. If a manufacturer cuts his price from 7 cents to 4 cents, i.e., by 43%, his final
price goes down only 21'% (from 14 cents to 11 cents). So price rivalry is discouraged,
A proportional or progressive excise tax, e.g., 5 cents on the cheaper pack, 10 cents on the
more expensive, would assure the firm choosing to compete in price that its full percentage
price cut would be passed on to the public.
96. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 797 (1946).
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requiring compulsory licensing in patent cases,97 and condemning otherwise
legal practices and relationships when power has been abused,0 8 a decree which
limited advertising expenditures of each of the "Big 3" to a certain percentage
of gross revenues would seem feasible. If economists agree on anything, they
probably agree that in cigarettes a limitation of advertising would offer some
hope for freer entry and bona fide competition of a socially useful kind.P
"1onopolizing" without Achieving .Alonopol
,
After Alcoa, "new" Sherman Act decisions went further than merely bring-
ing the law nearer to a position of outlawing monopoly power as such. They
suggested the possibility of condemning companies for controlling some ap-
preciable portion of interstate commerce. This conception of monopolizing
was much more disturbing to economists than the one in Alcoa, because the
"any part" of commerce which might be "monopolized" was not defined in
economically realistic terms. Consequently, a company might be held to have
monopolized without ever having achieved significant monopoly power.
The A & P decision '0 condemned a company that had helped to introduce
strong competition into the distribution of grocery products. The conviction
hinged essentially on abuses of power, in the traditional sense.10 ' A & P thus
represents an extension of the logic of the movie decisions. In both, the de-
fendants enjoyed a strategic superiority over their competitors, by virtue of
their size, bargaining power, and vertical integration, as well as the gengraphic
dispersion of their operations. And, as in the movie decisions, the existence of
power was combined with some evidence of an intent to exercise it. A & P
coercively bargained for discriminatory discounts, and operated on unusually
low retail margins in selected market areas to "put the heat on" competitors.0 2
97. E.g., Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 36 (1945).
98. See, e.g., the treatment of vertical integration in the second Rcading case, United
States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26 (1920).
99. Evidently on the assumption that competition would continue along Tresent lines
exclusively, Tennant argues that a mere increase in the number of sellers would probably
increase the costs of distribution. Tennant, supra note 87, at 261-3. A limitation of advertis-
ing and a proportional, if not a progressive excise tax, would certainly help preclude such
an outcome. But even dissolution alone might have this effect. The pattern of extremely
high advertising expenditures, and extreme importance of brand, seems characteristic of
consumer goods industries dominated by a very small number of large sellers, as in ciga-
rettes and soap. In men's suits and shoes, on the other hand, where sellers are more
numerous (and there are no technological factors precluding this in cigarettes), there secms
to be a good deal more competition on the basis of genuine quality and price. See SToc:-
ING & WVATXIxs, MoNOPOLy A.ND FE- ETERPRIsE 72-6 (1951).
100. United States v. New York Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626
(E.D. IU. 1946), aff'd, 173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949).
101. See pp. 338-9 infra.
102. See the exchange between Dirlam & Kahn and Adelman, in 61 J. Poi. Eco:.. 43
(1953).
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But in the absence of anything approaching convincing evidence of undesir-
able market consequences, the A & P opinions also demonstrate some tend-
ency to attack the quest for bargains and discounts justified by the performance
of functions; efficient vertical integration on the ground that the profits earned
therefrom illegally subsidized retail competition; any regional discrepancies in
margins maintained by a big and powerful company, whether promotional, de-
fensive, or predatory in nature.103
A similar disregard for the overall market consequences of an integrated
firm's strategic competitive advantages was suggested in the first Yellow
Cab case. 0 4 In Yellow Cab the Supreme Court held that if the evidence
demonstrated an intent to monopolize, the mere fact that the vertical integra-
tion of taxicab manufacturing and operating companies precluded competitor
manufacturers from a substantial market would be sufficient to condemn the
arrangement under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.10 Taxicabs are sold in a
nation-wide market, and only a very small portion of that market was affected
by the defendant's activities, particularly since most taxicabs are nothing
more than specially painted passenger cars. By defining "any part" of inter-
state commerce as nothing more than a volume of business large enough to
satisfy a de minimis requirement, 1 6 and by extending the doctrine of conspiracy
to the organizers of a proprietary consolidation, 1 " the Court in effect con-
demned all vertical integration, contingent on the necessary demonstration of
intent to monopolize. However, subsequent proceedings have shown that the
latter condition is truly a substantial one.10 8
Similarly the International Salt case 109 in effect found any patent tie-in
a violation of both Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Section 3 of the Clayton
Act," 0 without regard to whether or not it substantially reduced competition
in the tied-in field as a whole. After declaring that "it is unreasonable, per se,
103. See Adelman, The A & P Case: A Study iin Applied Economic Theory, 53 Q. J.
EcoN. 238-57 (1949) ; GALBRArrH, op. cit. supra note 93, c. 10.
104. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947). For a discussion of this
and other intra-enterprise conspiracy cases, see Comment, 63 YA,.n L.J. 372 (1954).
105. "The amount of interstate trade thus affected by the conspiracy is immaterial....
Section 1 of the Act outlaws unreasonable restraints on interstate commerce, regardless of
the amount of the commerce affected .... And § 2 of the Act makes it unlawful to conspire
to monopolize 'any part' of interstate commerce, without specifying how large a part must
be affected. Hence it is enough if some appreciable part of interstate commerce is the sub-
ject of a monopoly, a restraint or a conspiracy. The complaint in this case deals with inter-
state purchases or replacements of some 5,000 licensed taxicabs .... That is an appreciable
amount of commerce under any standard....
"Likewise irrelevant is the importance of the interstate commerce affected in relation
to the entire amount of that type of commerce in the United States. . . ." Id. at 225-6.
106. See note 105 supra.
107. 332 U.S. 218, 229 (1947).
108. See pp. 341-3 infra.
109. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
110. See notes 7, 10 spra.
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to foreclose competitors from any substantial market," the Supreme Court
inferred a sufficient effect on competition from the mere fact that "the volume
of business affected by these contracts cannot be said to be insignificant or
insubstantial and the tendency of the arrangement to accomplishment of
monopoly seems obvious. ,," The "any part" of interstate commerce
deemed sufficient in Yellow Cab to condemn vertical integration which was
improperly motivated is obviously the same thing as the not insignificant
volume of business from which patent tie-ins may no longer legally foreclose
competitors.
It was the later extension of the reasoning in International Salt to exclusive
dealing, and the apparently ominous implications of Yellow Cab for vertical
integration achieved by financial consolidation, which make these two opinions
significant.
ExcLusIvE DEALING AND FULL REQUIREMENTS CONTRACTS
A realistic policy of maintaining competition must be flexible. It must leave
room within limits for price discrimination, exclusive dealing and full require-
ments contracts, tie-ins and package deals. Yet, it must prevent the unfair or
excessive constriction of market opportunities of competitors that these prac-
tices may entail." 2 Striking the balance between these offsetting considerations
has been the historic purpose and function of the rule of reason, embodied
not only in the courts' interpretations of the Sherman Act but also in the
Clayton Act which restricts its prohibitions to instances where competition
is threatened." 3
The A & P, International Salt and first Yellow Cab decisions, though in-
volving dissimilar business structures and practices had this in common: they
suggested that the Sherman Act condemns any of the above-mentioned prac-
tices if they represent the use of market leverage or financial resources to put
competitors at a disadvantage, regardless of any other economic consequences.
Recent Clayton Act decisions have shown the same tendency. At the risk
of some oversimplification, it may be said that Sections 2 and 3 11 of the Clay-
ton Act were for many years interpreted to require a demonstration that the
111. 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
112. The basic question before us is whether it would suffice to delete the words "un-
fair or" from this sentence. The "new critics" of antitrust favor deletion, since they %, .uld
have us judge these practices mainly, if not entirely, by appraising their overall conse-
quences. My view is that "unfair or" should be retained, since the act of exclusion, pruperly
defined as an act to unfairly preclude competitive entry, should itself be prohibited.
113. See, WIArus, PuBLic REGUL.TION OF Comarrrimm PnAcncas x:; Busr.ss
E-a=mRnsE 209-28 (1940); Lockhart & Sacks, The Relevance of Economic Factors in
Determining Whether Exchsive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 65
HAev. L. REv. 913 (1952) ; Curran, Excltsive Dcaling and Public Policy, 15 J. oF MarAnr-
IxG 133-44 (1950).
114. See note 7 supra.
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practices would probably have the effect of weakening the force of competition
in the entire interstate market affected; and that recent decisions have tended
to reduce the requirement to a showing that the practices may possibly
weaken the forces of competition, now or in the future, in some not insub-
stantial portion of the market, sectional or national, by putting some com-
petitors of the defendant, or his customers, at a disadvantage. 116 The modern
view clearly comes much closer to, indeed may be tantamount to, outlawing the
specified practices per se, which would mean the adoption of pure competition
as the law's standard.
Standard Oil Co. v. United States (Standard Stations) n ° is the most im-
portant recent case under Section 3 of the Clayton Act. Assessment of the
competitive impact of Standard's full requirements contracts was the primary
issue. In contrast with the previous decisions,11 7 the Supreme Court in this
case set out to require the Government to assume the burden of "some sort of
showing as to the actual or probable economic consequences of the agree-
ments. . ".."18 However, it found "the qualifying clause of § 3 . . . satisfied
by proof that competition has been foreclosed in a substantial share of the
line of commerce affected."11 The satisfying "proof" was the demonstration
that Standard's full requirements contracts covered 16' of the retail gasoline
outlets and 6.7% of the total gasoline sales in the western states. The sub-
stantiality of Standard's percentage share of the market was certainly a
more significant evidence of competitive impact than sufficed in International
Salt.120 But still, the Court really declined to appraise the economic conse-
quences, to consider whether or not the requirements contracts were eco-
nomically beneficial, or intensified rather than reduced competition in the
market. In short, Standard Stations seemed to say that all full requirements
contracts covering any "substantial" share of commerce are ipso facto illegal
115. In price discrimination cases, this gradual weakening of the required demon-
stration of competitive impact was halted and partially reversed in FTC v. Minneapolis
Honeywell Co., 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 206 (1952). Only
Justice Black, it appears from his dissent, was entirely prepared to accept the Commission's
flimsy evidence of injury to competition. Id. at 213. Justice Douglas' dissent specifically
dissociated itself from Black's analysis. Id. at 217.
More important, a majority of the Commission, as reconstituted under President Eisen-
hower, now apparently feels that the opposition to price discrimination has gone much too
far, and intends henceforth to assess market consequences in the light of standards of
workable rather than pure competition.
116. 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
11.7. See International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). Also see FTC
v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948) (reducing the burden of proof of anti-competitive
impact under § 2 of the Clayton Act).
118. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 302 (1949) (emphasis added).
Also see id. at 305-08.
119. Id. at 314.
120. In International Salt, the only measurement offered of the market affected was
the fact that tied-in sales of salt amounted to $500,000 in 1944. 332 U.S. 392, 395 (1947).
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because by their very nature they exclude competitors from that segment of
trade which they cover.1 21
The Richfield decision 122 merely extended Standard Stations' prohibition
to another member of the petroleum industry's "Big 7" on the West Coast.23
The main formal difference between the two cases concerned Richfield's de-
fense of its contracts with the 1,343 dealers (about 45 percent of the total) who
were its own lessees. These, it contended, were not independent businessmen,
but, in effect, its employees; it had "created" their businesses and could there-
fore hardly be suppressing pre-existing competition in confining their sales
to its own products. The district court dismissed this argument on the ground
that by all the traditional tests the lessees were independent businessmen who
assumed all the usual responsibilities and risks.
12
In appraising these developments, we will have two major questions to
ask. First, how much of the rule of reason is left? Second, can the attenuated
rule of reason that remains still play its historic economic role in modern
markets, where pure competition is neither attainable nor desirable ? The dis-
cussion will relate mainly to tie-ins, exclusive dealing, and requirements con-
tracts, though much of it applies to price discrimination as well.
The law does not turn on the incidental exclusion of competitors effected
by contracts issuing from a process of fair competition. Legality depends on
Whether or not power has been exerted in such a way as to impose an un-
reasonable handicap on competitors. Condemnation requires, in short, some-
thing like an intent to monopolize, carried into effect. Only if the requisite
power and intent are present, i.e., if the objectionable character of the action
is established, does the law strike down arrangements, contractual or pro-
prietary, which do no more than exclude competitors from a "not insubstan-
tial" market. Admittedly, however, the leading cases do not say this clearly.
121. See Schwartz, Potential Impairmnt of Compctition-The Impact of Standard
Oil of California v. United States on the Standard of Legality wuder the Clayton Act, 93
U. oF PA. L. R.v. 10 et seq. (1949) ; Austern, The Supreme Court and Scctiog 3 of the
Clayton Act-The Standard Oil of California Decision in A NEw Loorn AT A Trinusr
EN'FOaCErENr TENDS: AN Rusr LAw Svmposium 43 (1950) (hereinafter cited as 1950
Symposium); Lockhart & Sacks, supra note 113; Adelman in 1951 Syurosium 145.
122. United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1951), aff'd
per curiam, 343 U.S. 922 (1952).
123. In Richfield Judge Yank-nich apparently considered it unnecessary to consider
the percentages of the market affected by these contracts; he pointed out only that the
contracts at issue involved thousands of service stations and sales of over $40 million
annually. This absolute volume probably amounted to less than 3% of total gasoline
sales in the area, though a substantially higher proportion of the sales through service
stations alone. Compare figures he offered in Richfield, 99 F. Supp. 270, 28-6 (S.D. Cal.
1951), with those he cited in his earlier Standard Stations decision, 78 F. Supp. SQ0, M,9
(S.D. Cal. 1948).
124. 99 F. Supp. 280, 287-94 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
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Patent Tie-ins as Techniques of Monopolizing
In International Salt, the objectionable character of the act was clear.
International Salt used its patent monopoly power in machines to force lessees
to deny their patronage to competitors in the salt market. There has been
relatively little criticism of this decision. Yet the same economic criticism of
Standard Stations and Richfield might have applied to International Salt: The
Supreme Court did not inquire into how substantial a monopoly power Inter-
national Salt's patents gave it in the supply of machines, or whether or not
competition in the entire market for salt was significantly affected by the tie-
ins.125 Perhaps the reasons are that the intent was clearly to exclude, 120 and
that the law has been traditionally opposed to such abuses of a governmentally-
conferred monopoly privilege.12 7 But these are traditional legal distinctions,
not economic assessments of market power or consequence.
The Court did consider International Salt's economic justifications for the
125. See, e.g., Lockhart & Sacks, sitpra note 113, at 942-54, whose severe strictures
against Standard Stations, for its failure to ask these broader economic questions, do not
extend to patent tie-in cases. And see the discussion of the Times-Picayune case, pp.
324-7 infra, where the Supreme Court made precisely these economic appraisals (and
made them badly) under the Sherman Act, and acquitted the defendants.
126. Some observers have interpreted Justice Jackson's dictum "it is unreasonable,
per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial market," 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947), as
threatening the legality of all vertical integration or exclusive dealing regardless of intent
or consequence. See, e.g., Adelman, in 1951 SYmposiUm 143. This interpretation seems
unjustified. "Foreclosing" could not have meant the incidental exclusion of competitors
involved in every vertical merger, in every requirements contract. He could have meant
only deliberate exclusion by exercise of coercion.
There are only two reasonable constructions one may place upon this dictum. Neither
corresponds with the one offered by Adelman. Jackson may not have meant what he said; the
facts of the case required no such broad and sweeping declaration. Alternatively, his defini-
tion of "foreclosing" could not have embraced the "exclusion" which follows incidentally
from requirements contracts (note his Standard Stations dissent) or from vertical mergers
(note his votes to exonerate the defendants in United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334
U.S. 495 (1948), and United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338 (1949). The latter
construction has an interesting historical precedent; the dispute over the rule of reason
before 1912 was entirely analogous. Justices Peckham, Taft, and Harlan, who rejected the
rule of reason on the ground that Congress had prohibited all restraints of trade, did not
thereby condemn all contracts, or all partnership agreements-which, as Justice Holmes
pointed out in 1904, inevitably "restrain trade" in a sense. See Northern Securities Co. v.
United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400, 411 (1904) (dissenting opinion). Rather, they defined
restraints of trade as embracing only those contracts having the primary purpose and effect
of eliminating or weakening competition in the market. In precisely the same way Jackson's
conception of "foreclosing" embraced only the exclusion which is deliberate, collusive (as
in Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941), which he cites
to support his dictum), or coercive as in International Salt.
127. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917),
explicitly reversed the earlier Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty
Co., 77 Fed. 288 (6th Cir. 1896), and Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912).
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tie-in provision, and in so doing suggested a reconciliation of the legal pro-
scriptions and the requirements of workable competition:
"Of course, a lessor may impose . . . reasonable restrictions
designed in good faith to minimize maintenance burdens and to as-
sure satisfactory operation. . . But it is not .. .argued that the
machine is allergic to salt of equal quality produced by anyone except
International.... It is admitted that, at times, at least, competitors
do offer such a product. They are, however, shut out of the market
by a provision that limits it, not in terms of quality, but in terms of
a particular vendor."' ' 8
In short, restrictive provisions in contracts which are reasonably required
for the protection of the legitimate interests of one or both of the contracting
parties may still be upheld m0  The deciding question is really one of the
underlying intent, for only thus can the act be properly definedY320
Anti-Competitive Aspects of Restrictive Agreements
Exclusive dealing is anti-competitive when used by dominant firms to
ensconce themselves in the market. A sale or lease requires a buyer
or lessee as well as a seller or lessor, but it is against the latter two only
that Section 3 131 of the Clayton Act is directed. The purpose of Section
3 is to preserve the buyer's (lessee's) freedom of choice, and thus to protect
access to the market by competing sellers (lessors). -32 When full requirements
contracts were outlawed in Standard Stations the defendant was Standard,
not its dealers.13 3 And in appraising the competitive impact of the contracts,
128. 332 U.S. 392,397-8 (1947).
129. See McLaren, Related Problems of 'Requirements' Con tracts and Acqtisitions in
Vertical Integration under the Anti-trust Laws, 45 Iu- L. Rwv. 141 (1950). See also United
States v. United Shoe 'Machinery Corp., 258 U.S. 451 (1922); FTC v. Sinclair Refining
Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923) ; Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors, I'M F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1935),
aff'd, 299 U.S. 3 (1936). It is not at all clear that the Pick decision survives unscathed the
general proposition of International Salt that "the efficiency of uniting two products in use
is a matter to be judged by the user. The seller can protect his good will by insisting that
replacement parts meet his standards of efficiency, without prejudicing competition by re-
quirement that the parts be bought from him." See Schwartz, supra note 121, at 27. How-
ever, International Salt and Standard Stations do not destroy the reasonable right of manu-
facturers contractually to restrain competition to t1w extent necessary to protect their legiti-
mate interests.
130. See Kahn, supra note 9, at 50-3.
131. Seenote7supra.
132. See Timberg, The Rights of Ciatomer-Scller Selection in 1951 S-.-Aroslwu 152,
156-7.
133. The district court opinion steadfastly refers not so much to the contracts them-
selves as to Standard's adoption of them, the seller binding the buyer, or inducing the buyer
by various means, to accept such conditions. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 78 F. Supp.
850, 857, 859, 886 (S.D. Cal. 1948).
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the Supreme Court concluded that their use not only by Standard, but by its
six leading competitors as well, may reasonably be interpreted as having had
the effect of enabling
"[T]he established suppliers individually to maintain their own
standing and at the same time collectively, even though not collusive-
ly, to prevent a late arrival from wresting away more than an insig-
nificant portion of the market. ' 134
The contracts thus represented an instrument of policy by dominant sellers,
with the effect if not the purpose of exclusion over a wide market area. 136
The Standard Stations decision was not revolutionary. It seems reasonable
to conclude that what was forbidden here as well as in Richfield was a domin-
ant company's using its market power to impose full requirements contracts
as a condition of sale.136 The evidence of market power actually exerted,
with the effect' 37 of creating a serious potential impediment to competition,
surely sufficed to satisfy even the traditional rule of reason. Because of their
size, the public acceptance of their brands, the uniformity of their market
practices, and their direct financial control of numerous retail outlets, each of
the "Big 7" on the West Coast has obviously been in a position to insist on
exclusive handling. By so doing, the "Big 7" imposed on the industry
a pattern of retailing gasoline that gave the individual dealer virtually no
opportunity to acquire gasoline on a non-exclusive basis. Moreover, the pat-
tern probably entrenched the position of each oligopolist, and posed substan-
tial obstacles to new entrants. But Standard Stations and Richfield do not
prohibit a voluntary choice of such a method of doing business, by dealers who
134. 337 U.S. 293, 309 (1949) (emphasis added). See also Signode Steel Strapping
Co. v. FTC, 132 F.2d 48 (4th Cir. 1942) (in appraising the competitive impact of tie-ins
employed by the individual defendant, the court similarly considers the parallel restrictive
practices of other dominant firms).
135. "Standard's u.se of the contracts creates just such a potential clog on competition
as it was the purpose of § 3 to remove... ." 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1949) (emphasis added).
136. This is definitely Justice Frankfurter's present interpretation of his Standard
Station~s opinion. In his dissent in MPA he contrasts the facts with those in Standard
Stations: "The obvious bargaining power of the seller vis-a-vis the retailer does not, so
far as we are advised, have a parallel here .... In the [Standard Stations case] . . .we
recognized the discrepancy of bargaining power and pointed out that the retailers might still
insist on exclusive contracts if they wanted.... [In fact, his statement in the earlier decision
was not nearly so clear on this point. See note 150 infra.] And although we are not told
in this case whether the pressure for exclusive contracts comes mainly from the distributor
or the theater, there are indications that theaters often insist on exclusive provisions
FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S. 392, 402 (1953).
137. Judge Yankwich condemned "the intent, purpose and effect of the exclusive supply
provisions." 78 F. Supp. 850, 888 (S.D. Cal.* 1948). In Richfield, the same judge speaks
of the defendant's "coercive" tactics. 99 F. Supp. 280, 295-6 (S.D. Cal. 1951). See Coni-
ment, Vertical Forestalling under the Antitrust Laws, 19 U. oF Cm. L. REV. 583, 599-601
(1952).
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are offered a substantial freedom of choice to do business in other wmys.3as
A seller, even a very big one, may still be able to contract to supply a custom-
er's full requirements, if so requested.
The recent Motion Picture Advertising Service (MPA) decision 130 seemed
to deny this interpretation of Standard Stations. The Supreme Court upheld a
Federal Trade Commission order condemning exclusive exhibition agreements
between the four leading distributors of advertising films and their theater
customers as unfair methods of competition-1 0 Both the Commission and the
Court ignored the contention that no coercion was involved in obtaining the
contracts of exclusive supply, and that the theater owners actively requested
them."4 1 Neither showed how, if the distributors merely acceded to these
requests, they could be said to have competed unfairly. However, the Court
was strongly influenced by the view that it is up to an expert body like
the Commission to decide on the basis of the circumstances of each case
whether or not a particular competitive practice is unfair -;142 the FTC as now
reconstituted will probably do more in the future than it did in this case to
justify such confidence.'4
Exclusive Dealing in Oil and Effective Compctition
In Standard Stations, the Court prudently refused to apply economic per-
formance tests.'4 4 It chose to ignore the fact that exclusive dealing is "a
device for waging competition," as well as for denying competitors access to
the market, and that "retail stations . . .are the instrumentalities through
which competition for... [the] ultimate market is wvaged."'14 It is not at all
138. See McLaren, supra note 129, at 160-6. Some but not all members of the Anti-
trust Division take a view opposite to the one expressed here; they believe that Standard
Stations made it illegal per se for any company to sign full requirements contracts cover-
ing a "substantial" volume of business. See p. 314 supra.
139. FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
140. This litigation was based on § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 33 STAT.
719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1946).
141. It was this argument, mainly, which supported the respective dissents of Com-
missioner Mason, 47 F.T.C. 378, 394 (1950), Justice Frankfurter with Justice Burton con-
curring, 344 U.S. 392, 402 (1953), as well as the opinion of the circuit court overruling
the Commission, 194 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1952). See also note 136 supra.
142. 344 U.S. 392,396 (1953).
143. If Mason's attitude becomes that of the majority of the Commission, the latter
should henceforth apply something very close to the rule I have suggested in Clayton Act
§ 3 cases. See p. 315 supra.
144. 337 U.S. 293, 306-07 (1949). The reasons given were very similar to those we
have ourselves advanced for rejecting such tests. See Kahn, supra note 9, at 40-1. "Justice
Frankfurter said of the excluded considerations that they were 'most ill-suited for ascertain-
ment by the courts. I would go further, and dare to insinuate that they would baffle even
trained economists." Timberg, supra note 132, at 154. Sce United States v. Addyston Pipe
& Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271,283-4 (6th Cir. 1S98).
145. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 321-4 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
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clear that the dominant companies were progressively able to entrench them-
selves through exclusive dealing, or to eliminate competition among them-
selves. 146 Numerous elements of intense and socially beneficial competition
exist in the rivalry among majors and independents for dealers and retail out-
lets, and through dealers for consumer patronage. It is unlikely that the major
oil companies or any one else would have constructed so many conveniently
situated service stations had not the refiners some assurance that the stations
would carry their own products exclusively, 147 or that, without the exclusive
link, the refiner could so successfully have induced dealers to maintain clean
rest rooms and provide the motorist with many other services. Oil companies
have constructed their own exclusive outlets in order to compete more effec-
tively in the final market with refiners and distributors already entrenched
in that market. And exclusive dealing has often helped to assure adequate
representation for the producer of an unknown brand.
On the other hand, exclusive dealing 'has detrimental effects on workable
competition. Competition by pre-emption of desirable sites and market out-
146. This is the Government's contention, however. See Complaint, 11 62-4, United
States v. Standard Oil Co., Civil No. 11584-C, S.D. Cal., May 12, 1950. Lockhart and Sacks,
who persuasively argue the need for a more thorough investigation of the economic conse-
quences of exclusive dealing in § 3 cases, will apparently be satisfied if courts in the future
choose to regard Standard Stations as having turned not on the mere "substantiality" of the
commerce affected by these contracts, but on the dominant position of Standard and the fact
that the "Big 7," all using exclusive dealing, tied up stations selling over 55% of the gaso-
line in the area, and an even higher percentage of sales through retail stations alone. Lock-
hart & Sacks, sapra note 113, at 930-1, 940-1.
But even such a finding does not really resolve the economic issue. It does not prove
that competition in the industry was unworkable, or that exclusive dealing tended signifi-
cantly to make it so. Consider the very real rivalry between the "Big 7" and the powerful
market impact of the substantial fringe of independents in refining and marketing. See
CASSADY & JONES, THE NATURE OF COMPETITION IN GASOLINE DISTRIBUTION AT THE
RETAIL LEvEL (1951.) ; Madison, Proposed Andments of the Federal Antitrust Law and
its Relation to "Big Business", in 1951 SymaposIu 116-117. Consider, also, the increased
efficiency of marketing under methods of controlled distribution, and the industry's im-
pressive record of expansion of capacity and product improvement. See Dirlam & Kahn,
Leadership and Conflict in the Pricing of Gasoline, 61 YALE L.J. 818 (1952).
147. Here is an illustration of the familiar Schumpeterian thesis about monopolistic
incentives to investment and innovation. Similarly, oil companies might (though one could
never prove this) have been less willing to invest heavily in exploration and discovery of
new sources of crude oil, and in expansion of refining capacity, without controlled market
outlets.
Richfield contended that it could not reasonably be accused of "foreclosing" competition
when it denied other refiners access to service stations which it had itself constructed. 99
F. Supp. 280, 291-4 (S.D. Cal. 1951). It was by similar reasoning that the common law
reconciled the grant of letters patent for inventions or new industries with a general hostility
to other monopolies which denied to people rights of entry that they had previously en-
joyed. This contention surely has some merit. On the other hand, much of the acqulisition
of service stations by majors has represented not new construction but preemption of desir-
able sites, and control of already constructed stations by purchase and long-term lease.
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lets has probably produced an uneconomic profusion of service stations.1'4
Moreover, competition through tied outlets is competition of a channelized and
limited kind. Control over these outlets confers on the big refiner a means of
limiting price rivalry at both retail and wholesale levels, and of impeding ac-
cess to the market by the smaller, independent refiners and marketers, who
are usually the price cutters. Standard of California has been the price leader
on the West Coast and a price cutter in the East largely because in the one
it enjoys, and in the other it lacks, a broad market coverage with controlled
outlets.1
49
Moreover, it is difficult to see why many of the mutual benefits and socially
beneficent consequences of exclusive dealing require coercion for their achieve-
ment.150 Nothing prevents refiners from granting discounts that measure the
cost savings of regularly scheduled, volume purchases. There is no reason why
a supplier could not continue to give advice, assistance, and free paint to deal-
ers who handle its products, as long as these favors are not conditioned on
exclusive handling, and still exert pressure on dealers to keep their rest rooms
clean, wipe windshields, and provide free air. In any case, now that the motor-
ist has become accustomed to these free services, the keen competition among
dealers should ensure that they will continue to be forthcoming.
148. See 2 BAI, TnE Ecoxomcs OF THE PACIFIC COAST PLO1LEUM Ii;Dusriy 239-0
(1945). In listing the various economic considerations that they feel the courts should take
into account in § 3 cases, Lockhart and Sacks mention the "effect [of exclusive dealing] on
bringing additional dealers into the market" Lockhart & Sacks, supra note 113, at 926-7.
However, they recognize this may not be an unmixed economic gain. Ibid. Do they imply
therefore that the Supreme Court should have had to decide whether there were too many
gas stations on the West Coast, and weigh against this possible waste the economic benefits
of competition among the excessively numerous dealers? Or should the Court have decided
what portion of these offsetting consequences were properly attributable to exclusive deal-
ing, and weigh these benefits of exclusive dealing against the losses, before deciding whether
Standard might legally exert its leverage to close a substantial market to competitors?
Would such a procedure make the law clearer to businessmen, as the critics of antitrust
demand, and diminish the uncertainties of the law as now interpreted?
149. Richfield explained its $20 million investment in retail stations, leased out with
a stipulation of exclusive dealing, on the ground that after World War II it was compelled
to secure an assured market for its expai~ded refinery capacity. On the other hand, since it
would have been compelled by the pressure of refinery capacity to find some outlet for its
products, it seems probable that without such a guaranteed market Richfield would have
been forced to offer price inducements to get dealers to carry its products, just as Standard
of California has apparently been doing in the last few years on the East Ccast. The re-
sultant price competition might have taken on a cut-throat character, as it has sporadically
on the East Coast. But the critics of Standard Stations have not, to my knowledge, pressed
the defense of exclusive dealing that it holds price rivalry in check.
150. "If in fact it is economically desirable for service stations to confine themselves
to the sale of the petroleum products of a single supplier, they will continue to do so though
not bound by contract. . . ." 337 U.S. 293, 313-14 (1949). The language of this dictum,
among others, apparently forecloses the possibility of dealers voluntarily signing require-
ments contracts. The fact remains that they were not given this choice in the present
instance, and it is by no means certain what the Court would have done had they been.
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An economist can hardly be certain that a law which denies to dominant
refiners the right to insist on exclusive dealing will weaken the force of
market competition. The probabilities would seem to be to the contrary, and
this is, after all, what the Clayton Act presumed and Standard Stations con-
tends. It is not necessarily an undesirable consequence of Standard Stations
that a major refiner wishing to exercise firmer control over retail outlets than
the law now permits must assume the additional risks and responsibilities
of owning and operating them itself.'r' That full integration may permit
greater operating control is balanced by the fact that it is also more expensive.
In the face of social security and chain store taxes, it seems unlikely that the
oil companies will attempt full integration.
Tie-ins and Requirements Contracts to Maintain and Consolidate a
Dominant Market Position
Five-year requirements contracts, and alleged tie-ins between leases of can-
closing machinery and the sale of cans, were under scrutiny in American
Can.'52 Unlike Standard of California, American Can did not flatly refuse
to do business on a non-exclusive basis; it solicited and obtained the require-
ments contracts largely by the offer of numerous competitive inducements :10
discounts in ancillary contracts; payments of large sums of money and pur-
chases of can-making equipment from customers at inflated values, in order
to obtain can business; the leasing of machines and other equipment to custom-
ers at nominal rentals. 54 The district court conceded that some of these
tactics were indistinguishable from ordinary methods of competitive salesman-
ship, such as extension of credit, servicing of leased machinery, and equaliza-
tion of freight rates.155 But, considering American Can's position in the industry
151. Lockhart and Sacks would have the courts accept as a conclusive defense of ex-
clusive dealing the prospect that its elimination would be "likely to cause the supplier to
obtain the same results through integrating.... ." Lockhart & Sacks, supra note 113, at 928.
The proposal seems both unrealistic and undesirable. The prediction it requires is surely
almost impossible. What one can predict with some certainty is that the demand for ex-
clusive representation is, like most demand curves, positively elastic; if courts raise the
price, by denying sellers the cheap way of achieving it, less will be demanded. In any event,
a firm that wishes to chance its own capital and managerial effort in undertaking a new
function must be permitted to do so in a free enterprise system, unless the effect is a sub-
stantial restraint on competition. It must not be permitted to achieve the anticipated benefits
by coercing businessmen who are supposed to be independent bargaining agents.
152. United States v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. Cal. 1949).
153. Standard too used "competitive inducements"; it assisted its dealers in numerous
ways which were certainly regarded by both parties as a quid pro quo for being a "Standard
dealer." But the courts did not consider these blandishments in that case; they condemned
the contracts themselves. Of course, the Clayton Act prohibition includes the offer of dis-
counts or rebates which are conditional on acceptance of exclusive dealing or tie-ins. See
statute cited note 7 supra.
154. 87 F. Supp. 18, 27-8 (N.D. Cal. 1949).
155. Id. at 28.
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and the entire course of its business dealings over the years, the district court
finally concluded that the tie-ins and requirements contracts, and the methods
employed to obtain them, represented something quite different from forth-
right, bona fide competition. To the court, they bore an unmistakable odor
of monopolizing.156
The findings in American Can did not controvert economic common sense.
In 1946, American Can's share in national production of cans, sales of cans,
and ownership of can-closing machines available for lease was 40, 46, and 54
percent respectively. Its share of can sales in the several regional market
areas was often higher and sometimes lower. It seems indisputable that the
tying together of two such dominant positions, in cans and machinery, whether
by persuasion or rigid company policy, created additional monopoly power,
each position reinforcing the other. The same conclusion seems justified with
respect to the requirements contracts. While the inherent tendency in the
district court's evaluation of American Can's methods is to deny to large
firms the use of certain competitive devices to gain or retain customers, the
same thing might be said of almost every Section 2 case from Standard of
New Jersey in 1911,1 5 7 to United Shoe Machinery in 19 53.11s The courts
have always condemned business practices which, though not inherently preda-
tory and not unreasonable in other circumstances or if employed by other
companies, amounted in the circumstances of these cases to the use of market
leverage to maintain long-established dominant market positions.
Tie-ins are ordinarily dangerous only if the contract embraces one product
or operation in which the company enjoys substantial monopoly power. This
monopoly provides the lever for extending power into othenvise competitive
areas. American Can seems to identify the lever as the defendant's dominant
position in leasing can-closing machines. But the major reason for this posi-
tion, apparently, was that American Can rented the machines cheaply, in
order to induce canners to take its cans exclusively. If American Can's "pow-
er" in the machinery field, which gave it leverage to force its cans on lessees,
issued merely from its willingness to absorb book losses on leasing, it might
not seem as clear to an economist as to the court that a monopoly power in
one area was used to reduce competition in another, or indeed that the low
charge on leasing machines was anything more than an accounting fiction.150
The only relevant price might be that of the total pack-age, not of any one
156. Ibid.
157. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).158. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953).
159. Were patents involved, as in Intcrnational Salt, the company's apparent policy of
making its money on cans rather than on machines might have reasonably been adduced as
additional evidence of an intent to use a legal monopoly in one area to obtain a preferred,
profitable position in another. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co.,
243 U.S. 502, 516-17 (1917). The court took note of the effect of American Can's low
rentals in restricting the market opportunities of independent manufacturers of can-closing
machines as well as of cans. 87 F. Supp. 18, 24 (N.D. Cal. 1949). But if American Can
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part of it. If this combined price for machines and cans under five-year con-
tracts was not satisfactory, the customers might have turned elsewhere. And,
if a customer's alternatives were too limited, the responsibility may have lain not
with American Can's tie-ins, but with inability of competitors to offer the
combined services as satisfactorily.' 60
American Can, however, should not have turned on the comparative effi-
ciency or market performance of the defendant and its integrated or non-
integrated competitors. Antitrust policy should not inquire into whether or
not a package bargain is the most satisfactory for customer and supplier
alike. The appropriate inquiry is whether or not the customer is given a
real opportunity to accept or reject the combination on its merits. Most
canners enjoyed no such opportunity on reasonable terms ;161 access to the
market by independent canners was thus unreasonably constricted.
The economic consequences of the American Can decision cannot be pre-
dicted at this early date. The decree did not substantially alter the industry's
structure. However, within sixteen months after final judgment was entered,
canners chose to purchase outright approximately 27% of American Can's
machines. 1 62 Evidently the defendant's "package" did not suit all the custom-
ers. If this greater freedom of choice on the part of canners has any effect
at all, it can only contribute to easier entry of competitors into the call
industry.
The unfortunate Times-Picayune decision '03 denied a similar free choice
to newspaper advertisers in New Orleans. The defendants required pur-
was accused of using the attractiveness of its combined offer to eliminate competition at
one and the same time in can-closing machines and in cans, was it not attacked merely for
making an attractive combined offer, i.e., for its size and efficient integration alone?
160. For an argument that such a package offer might suit the needs of small users
(canners in this instance) who lack the capital to purchase the machines, see Lockhart &
Sacks, supra note 113, at 947-8. That exposition fails to indicate why offering users the
option of leasing machines requires a tie-in. Nor, of course, does it justify American Can's
policy which offered no such option, but insisted on leasing. 87 F. Supp. 18, 23 (N.D. Cal.
1949).
161. The determination of where one product or service ends and another begins,
crucial to the identification of tie-ins, is inevitably in some measure arbitrary. When the
court ordered American Can to offer cans and machinery separately, it was merely accept-
ing the company's own formal usage. The two did not constitute inseparable parts of a unit;
it would not have been unreasonable to ask for either one without the other on proportional-
ly the same terms as they were available in combination. The same is true of the supply of
cans for any one year, which American Can tied to the supply for the subsequent four years.
It does not follow that American Can must henceforth fill some canner's order for half cans,
or for a single day's supply of cans.
162. Report of the Antitrust Division, p. 34, United States v. American Can Co., 87 F.
Supp. 18 (N.D. Cal. 1949) (made pursuant to order entered on July 9, 1952, concerning
Pacific American Fisheries, Inc., dated Dec. 22, 1952).
163. Times Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953), 63 YA.I:
L.J. 389 (1954).
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chasers of general display and classified advertising to take space in both the
morning Times-Picayune (the only morning and the most important news-
paper in New Orleans) and the evening States, which competed with the
city's only other newspaper, the evening Item. The defendants contended
that their two publications were really separate editions of a single newspaper.
Yet a substantial volume of evidence, including assertions by the company's
own executives in soliciting advertising, argued to the contrary. The tie-in
was not an inevitable, "natural" single package, but in part at least a policy
decision adopted "to slow the Item down." 10 -4
Despite the precedents of International Salt and Grifith,loa the Supreme
Court decided that such a tie-in did not violate the Sherman Act. It said that
the decisive question in gauging the legality of the unit plan was vhether or
not the defendants enjoyed a "dominant position," since "the essence of
illegality in tying agreements is the wielding of monopolistic leverage....1c0
Since the morning newspaper's sales of general display and classified advertising
were only 40% of the total in New Orleans, and would have been 33%% if all
papers were of equal size, the Court concluded that the defendant's power fell
short of the necessary "dominance."
This computation compounded three errors, in ascending order of import-
ance. First, the Court said that the relevant market in this case was the one
where newspapers compete for advertisers, not readers. Accordingly, it com-
puted the share of the morning newspaper, the Times-Picayune, in advertising
lineage, not in circulation. But in the advertising market, a newspaper in effect
tries to sell its readership to the buyers of advertising space.10 7 The Times-
Picayune had 46%c of the combined circulation of the three newspapers. Its
40% share of combined advertising lineage was necessarily lower, because of
the unit rule itself; under that rule, no one could buy space in the morning
paper without buying it in the lower circulation States as well. So, even if
the Item closed up shop entirely, giving the defendants a complete monopoly,
the morning Times-Picayune could not possibly obtain over 50, of the
relevant advertising business.
Second, if the correct computation was of the position of the defendants
in the combined morning and evening newspaper market, the Court should
have added together the lineage of the two papers bound together by the unit
164. See 105 F. Supp. 670, 678 (E.D. La. 1952). Mfany advertisers obviously did not
consider the package a single product until they were forced to do so. Before adoption of
the unit rule, less than half as many classified advertisers and something less than two-
thirds as many general display advertisers bought space in the States as in the Times-
Picayune. Afterward, of course, the percentage rose at once to almost 100. See 345 U.S.
594, 618-19 (1953).
165. See pp. 306, 312-13 supra.
166. 345 U.S. 594,611 (1953).
167. Id. at 610.
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rule. This would have given the Court a figure of 78% of the general display
and classified advertising market being dominated by the defendants.
The Court's simple, glaring and third error was to add together the "tying"
and the "tied-in" markets in its calculation. The Court justified its considera-
tion of the morning and evening fields as a single market on the ground that:
"No dominant 'tying' product exists (in fact, since space in neither
the Times-Picayune nor the States can be bought alone, one may be
viewed as 'tying' as the other) ; no leverage in one market excludes
sellers in the second, because for present purposes the products are
identical and the market the same."'16
But, it was the position of the Times-Picayune in the morning field that pro-
vided the leverage. This share was 100% ; the same as the share of the
Griffith chain in towns where it owned the only theater, and of International
Salt in its patented machines. The Court might have seen through its spurious
contention merely by looking at the consequences of imposing the unit rule.
The immediate result was to pull the lineage of the States up to that of the
Times-Picayune, and not the other way around.109 Any advertiser who
wanted to reach a morning audience had to patronize the States as well. This
must have been precisely what the defendants had in mind in imposing the
rule,170 and this is what happened.
The Court should certainly have concluded, as the district court did in
American Can, that the insistence on a combination, package deal by so domin-
ant a seller unfairly constricted the market opportunities of other, non-inte-
grated sellers, without regard to their relative efficiency or to the economic
merits of the arrangements. The most unfortunate consequence of Times-
Picayune is that it implies the Court will henceforth have to be convinced of
substantial deleterious effects on existing competition before it will condemn
a device which has nothing to be said in its favor, and which discourages corn-
petitive entry into a field increasingly dominated by local monopolies. 171
Reasonable "package" bargains need not be prohibited. American Can
recognized that the canning industry, dependent as it is on variable crops,
needs contracts imposing mutual obligations: the canner to buy its cans solely
from one supplier; and the manufacturer to supply as many cans as the size
168. Id. at 614.
169. See the statistics, id. at 618-19.
170. There was one partially offsetting consideration in the case of classified adver-
tising alone. The Item had previously owned a morning paper and used the unit rule for
classified advertising before the Times-Picayune adopted it in 1933. This fact hardly justi-
fies the latter's adoption of the same rule for general advertising in 1949, eight years after
the demise of its morning competitor, and after it had become the dominant newspaper and
had attained a monopoly of the morning field.
171. Justice Clark ingenuously admits this consequence. 345 U.S. 594, 603-05, 623
(1953). See Comment, Local Monopoly in the Daily Newspaper Industry, 61 YAL L.J.
948 (1952).
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of the harvest dictates. Consequently, one-year requirements contracts were
approved as meeting the needs of both parties, while permitting "competitive
influences to operate at the expiration of said period."172  And, nothing in
American Can denied defendant the right to offer canners, without coercion,
the opportunity to take its machines and cans together. The market could
then judge the advantages of the combination, as it could not before. But in
Times-Picayune, the Supreme Court was so impressed with the cost-savings
of integration that it completely ignored the possibility of permitting an inte-
grated newspaper to pass the lower costs of joint advertising on by offering
advertisers a unit rate, fairly mirroring the savings, without permitting the
use of the inflexible unit rule.7 3
The apparent willingness of the courts to permit exclusive supply arrange-
ments which are not the product of coercion, and which are beneficial to both
parties without unreasonably excluding competitors, suggests that the earlier
Bausch & Lomb 174 decision still stands. This case involved a contract be-
tween Bausch & Lomb, which manufactured and ground pink-tinted lenses,
and the Soft-Lite Lens Co., the exclusive distributor, which sold the lenses
under its trade name. These arrangements were held legal, because they "were
developed through arm's length negotiations," and protected Soft-Lite, which
was "spending large sums to develop [its] good wil and enlarge the public
patronage of a relatively new article of commerce."' 1 , Moreover, Bausch &
Lomb did not have a monopoly in the manufacture of glass for lenses. "On the
contrary ... other manufacturers of lenses have had access to pink glasses
from other sources and . . . the success of Soft-Lite ... stimulated emulation
and competition." Furthermore, "there [was] competition between untinted
and tinted lenses, as well as in the various tints of lenses and among the
distributors of pink tinted lenses . .. .""o In short, the agreement did not
involve the use of market power by a dominant seller to exclude competitors.
It was not anti-competitive either in intent or in effect.
172. United States v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 18, 31 (N.D. Cal. 1949). For
a similar decree, see United States v. Linde Air Products Co., 83 F. Supp. 978 (N.D. Ill.
1949) ; see also the FTC orders in the cases involving the four leading prcducers and dis-
tributors of advertising films, supra note 141. Since the defect in the reasoning of the
Commission's majority was its failure to consider that theater owners may have vanted
these long-term contracts, nothing would have been lost by a decree which forced distributors
to offer shorter contracts, while permitting theaters to sign longer ones if they wished.
173. See 345 U.S. 594, 623-4 (1953). The decision of the lower court, condemning
the tie-in, likewise failed to differentiate the unit rule (a refusal to sell space except on a
unit basis) and the unit rate (a favorable combined price to induce advertisers to take
space in both papers). The Times-Picayune went far beyond the legitimate comratitive
persuasion of passing on to customers the cost-savings of producing a joint service.
174. United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 45 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1942),
aff'd, 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
175. Id. at 391,398-9.
176. Id. at 398-9.
1954]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
The Borderline between Competing and Foreclosing
National City Lines:
The practice of offering customers inducements to make it worth their
while to enter an exclusive relationship is a widespread phenomenon.117 The
National City Lines decision 178 seems to indicate much more clearly than
American Can that such practices and arrangements may be unequivocally
illegal under either the Sherman or Clayton Act,1' 0 if a few million dollars
of sales are involved.
In National City Lines, Firestone Tire and Rubber, General Motors, Mack
Manufacturing, Phillips Petroleum, and Standard of California were con-
victed of conspiring to monopolize "certain portions of interstate commerce,"180
because they had jointly furnished capital to two busline holding companies
in exchange for ten-year contracts for the exclusive supply of tires, busses
and petroleum products. In testing whether or not the exclusive arrangements
with 46 bus lines in 45 cities amounted to a monopoly, under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, of "any part" of interstate commerce, the effect on competition
was established by analogy to the Yellow Cab decision: the contracts (vertical
177. During an inflationary period, it may be more common for customers to solicit
the favorable attention of suppliers by such means. See, e.g., the 'proposed loan of $28 million
from General Motors to Jones & Laughlin, in exchange for "an assured supply of steel until
the loan is paid off." The relationship in this case was not exclusive, but preferential.
Business Week, Dec. 16, 1950, pp. 111-112. An interesting variant is the contract in which
Phillips Petroleum gave the Barium Steel Corp. a share in its crude oil and gas leases,
reportedly in exchange for supplies of scarce steel. N.Y. Herald Tribune, June 14, 1951,
p. 41, col. 3.
178. United States v. National City Lines, Inc., 186 F.2d 562 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
341 U.S. 916 (1951).
179. National City Lines illustrates clearly the tendency of the courts in recent years
to obliterate the distinction between the two Acts, while weakening the rule of reason as
applied to both. With the International Salt and Standard Stations decisions greatly reduc-
ing the required demonstration of competitive impact (under § 3 of the Clayton Act), with
the former decision declaring it also unreasonable per se and illegal (under § 1 of the Sher-
man Act) to foreclose competitors from any substantial market, and with the first Yellow
Cab opinion finding that such an action might constitute monopolization of "any
part" of the national market (under § 2 of the Sherman Act), the way was paved for
applying any and all of these statutory provisions to condemn tie-ins or exclusive dealing
by any big company, despite Justice Frankfurter's attempt in Standard Stations to limit
the reduced burden of proof to the Clayton Act. 337 U.S. 293, 297, 311-14 (1949). Thus
American Can was condemned under §§ 1 and 2 (Sherman) and 3 (Clayton); Richfield
under §§ 1 (Sherman) and 3 (Clayton) ; and National City Lines under § 2 (Sherman).
There were of course some differences between these cases, in some measure justifying
different legal treatment. But the fact that the tie-in in National City Lines (a tie-in of
exclusive supply contracts to loans) did not fall within the language of the Clayton Act,
did not prevent the success of a far more limited proof of consequences than sufficed in
Standard Stations. But see Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594
(1953), which attempts to preserve the distinction between the two laws.
180. 186 F.2d 562, 564 (7th Cir. 1951).
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integration) involved sales to bus (taxicab) operating companies, amounting
in 1946 to more than $11 million (replacements for 5,000 cabs), from which
competitors were excluded.'". Although the percentage of the total national or
regional sales of the companies or products in question was negligible, the
effect on competition in both cases was more than "insubstantial." But, while
Yellow Cab was ultimately exonerated because the lower court found no evi-
dence of illegal intent,1 2 evidence indicating that it w.,as the bus companies
that had been in financial straits and had approached the suppliers for assist-
ance did not save the defendants in National City Lines.18s
National City Lines hinged largely on a finding of conspiracy.is The sup-
plier defendants were separate firms, whose individual subscriptions to the
bus-line holding companies' stock were apparently predicated on an under-
standing that the others were doing the same. But the question arises whether
acts, which might escape censure if committed individually, are made offen-
sive because they arise out of a "conspiracy" between non-competing finns.285
Moreover, the Yellow Cab defendants were likewise held to have conspired as0
Nevertheless, in National City Lines the exclusive contracts were held suffi-
cient evidence of an intent to exclude.18 7 So the Clayton Act's prohibition of
specific practices, regardless of intent,188 together with the diminished stand-
ard of substantiality of effect of the first Yellow Cab case, 8 9 was incorporated
into Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Yet, there was no incorporation of the
saving proviso in Yellow Cab, requiring evidence of an intent to monopolize100
National City Lines stands at the frontier between competition and freedom
of contract, on the one hand, and exclusion on the other. Competition consists
in large measure of offering financial inducements- "free" service, discounts,
credit, leases at nominal rentals, assistance in decorating, constructing or ar-
ranging a place of business-in exchange for a contract of sale. Are such in-
ducements illegal if they succeed in getting and holding a customer? While it
181. Id. at 567-8.
182. So F. Supp. 936 (N.D. Ill. 1948).
183. 186 F.2d 562, 572-3 (7th Cir. 1951). The defendants could find small comfort in
the court's concession that they "obviously... were entitled to offer evidence as to their
intent and motives ... in entering into the transactions," since the court really found the
resulting arrangements per se void.
184. Id. at 564-6, 570-1.
185. Since each supplier received an exclusive contract, the plan obviously had no room
for direct competitors. Each of the two oil companies obtained the exclusive contract for
bus companies operating in its ovn market area.
186. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 229 (1947).
187. 186 F2d 562, 571 (7th Cir. 1951). See also Comment, Vertical Forcslalling under
the Antitrust Laws, 19 U. OF CL L Rzv. 583, 601-11 (1952).
188. See, e.g., MIU.M, UNFAM CoM. rnoN 62-3 (1941) ; WNATmns, Punuc rEuL&-
non OF Comrs-nvE PRAcncEs ix BusiNEss EnTEnPmsE 3S (1940).
189. See p. 312 suPra.
190. 332 U.S. 218, 220,224,227,228 (1947). The defendants were subsequently exoner-
ated because the alleged specific intent to monopolize was not found. 338 U.S. 338 (1949).
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is doubtful that the case was worth 'bringing or that the decision was sound,
it probably does not go so far. What was involved -here was a program em-
barked upon by a group of companies, who joined through an intermediary to
purchase control of a number of potential customers, in exchange for the
intermediary's promise to divert to them for ten years all the patronage of the
subsidiaries thus acquired. Their course of action might reasonably have been
characterized as demonstrating an intent to gain assured customers by other
than normal competitive methods.""' It is surely one of the traditional pur-
poses of the antitrust laws to prevent the exercise of financial power for no
other purpose than to sew up markets. It does not follow, then, that a supplier
must henceforth deny a customer's uncoerced and uninduced request for a
full requirements contract.
And though it is certainly doubtful that the actions of the National City
Lines defendants had an appreciable deleterious effect on competition, the de-
cision is not likely to have harmful economic consequences. In the long run, the
cause of effective competition is served if firms are not permitted to use their
financial resources to bind customers to them for long periods of time.1 2
Indeed, perhaps suppliers should not be encouraged to be investment bankers
for their customers. The economist must consider the alternative uses of such
191. This evaluation is implicit in the Seventh Circuit's description of the plan. It
points out that the suppliers subscribed to the preferred stock "at prices in excess of pre-
vailing market prices"; that before the arrangements in question National and Pacific City
Lines had bought their equipment and supplies from "different suppliers, with no long-
term contract with any of them." 186 F.2d 562, 565 (7th Cir. 1951).
192. This is certainly the case where the customer is a regulated monopoly whose
rates depend on book costs. As Adelman points out with reference to the Yellow Cab
situation, so here the decision might have turned on the possible injury to the consuming
public resulting from obtaining a monopoly in the supply of equipment to such public
utilities. Adelman, Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1289,
1317 n.103 (1948). In fact, however, it did not. It is not clear that a supplier, acting as a
banker, should be permitted to attach conditions to its loans which no banker would be
permitted to attach, even if it were the borrower who came to him first. See the analogous,
but much stronger, case against a company in the business of making loans on real estate,
for requiring borrowers to take out hazard insurance exclusively through or from it. Com-
plaint, United States v. Investors Diversified Services, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 645 (D. Minn.
1951). The Department of Justice does not claim that the defendants in this case any more
than in National City Lines enjoy a monopoly in the lending business, to which they tie
their other sales; or that they have achieved or threaten to achieve a monopoly in the tied-in
markets, other than that portion of the business which they obtain for themselves in this
fashion. However, no evidence seems necessary to show that a company which made over
$192,000,000 of mortgage loans in 1949 enjoyed a substantial power to limit the freedom
of borrowers in their choice of insurance companies. The resultant restraint in the tied-in
field was surely unreasonable.
The Government's definition of "monopolizing"-without reference to market shares or
elasticity of demand-may seem meaningless to an economist. Its use, however, is a sign
not necessarily of economic illiteracy but of the irrelevancy of market structure or per-
formance tests; monopolizing at law is a coercive and unreasonable course of conduct.
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funds, and the possible distortion of investment when the capital market is
circumvented and extraneous criteria guide it.103
When it is necessary for suppliers to offer services or credit to make sales,
it may be presumed they will continue to do so, even if they can not get an
exclusive relationship in exchange. In fact, to the extent that the law strength-
ens the hand and increases the discretion of purchasers or dealers, sellers may
have to compete more vigorously than before for their custom, and perhaps in
socially more beneficial ways.194 Any slackening of competitive efforts that
may occur because the law has removed the prize of an exclusive relationship
should be more than offset by greater freedom of entry into markets now
rendered expensive to penetrate by the necessity of providing capital to
customers, or of setting up one's own distributive outlets.
J. I. Case:
The recent antitrust suit against J. I. Case 105 illustrates how complex the
task often is of drawing the line between competition and exclusion. Most
farm machinery is sold through dealers, each of whom is the exclusive local
representative of a single full-line manufacturer, and for the most part handles
the line of only one manufacturer. The exclusiveness is not tight, since only a
small minority of dealers handle no competitive equipment whatsoever. Al-
though these arrangements are not embodied in binding contracts, the ex-
clusive agency-exclusive dealing pattern is typical, particularly as far as the
full line is concerned.' 9 6 To break up this pattern, the Department of Justice
launched civil suits against International Harvester, John Deere and J. I.
Case; when it lost the suit against Case in the district court, the only one to
go to trial, it dropped them all.
The Government contended that it was the general policy of J. I. Case to
have its dealers handle its products exclusively. The district court agreed
"that Case has been intent... on obtaining dealers who will devote the major
part of their activities to the Case line.. .. ,107 The Government also argued
that the company's field representatives continually exerted pressure on the
retailers, backed by the threat of contract termination, to drop competitive
193. The suppliers presumably consider the "investment" a remunerative one, regarding
it perhaps like a price concession that returns a net price still above incremental costs. It
remains possible that the ultimate use to whici the funds were put was uneconomic from
the social point of view, in the same way as the excessive construction of service stations
by major oil companies in the past. See note 149 suPra.
194. The big oil companies compete very vigorously for large commercial accounts,
usually offering secret discounts from the openly posted prices. The ability of the National
City bus lines to bargain in this fashion was obviously seriously restricted by their con-
tractual obligation to buy all requirements from Standard of California and Phillips.
195. United States v. J. I. Case Co., 101 F. Supp. 856 (D. Minn. 1951).
196. FTC, REPoRT oN MANUFACTURE AND Disnu i0. oF FAn I1mrw :.-;rs 113-
114, 126-7 (1948).
197. United States v. J. I. Case Co., 101 F. Supp. 856, 861 (D. Minn. 1951).
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lines. It cited 108 dealers as having been subjected to specific acts of coercion
and pressure of this kind. The court conceded that there had been "flagrant
attempts to coerce and put pressure on a few dealers to give up competing
lines as a condition for obtaining a Case contract or to obtain a renewal. . .. "108
These policies and pressures, the Government contended, had caused contracts
with a substantial and increasing number of dealers to be accompanied by
understandings that they would be exclusive, and therefore effected an un-
reasonable restraint of trade under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.199 These
understandings also violated Section 3 of the Clayton Act, it argued, regard-
less of whether they were secured by coercion, since the effect was to exclude
competitors from selling to large numbers of the Case dealership organiza-
tion.200 In short, the Government contended that the market must be free of
even voluntary contractual constraints; at every moment everyone must be
free to contract with everyone else.
The court, on the other hand, saw no legal objection to exclusive dealing
as such, whether secured by contract or understanding. The manufacturer had
the right to select distributors according to whether or not they gave its
products "fair representation," and were "sold, so to speak, and enthusiastic
about its line."120 1 And, the manufacturer might reasonably withdraw its ma-
chines from a dealer who divided his loyalties and attention between two full
lines. But, the purpose of these methods must not 'be to effect a monopoly,
and the methods cannot be "unreasonably coercive. '202 Moreover, there must
198. Id. at 864-5. The Government claimed that in almost none of the 108 instances of
alleged coercion did the company bring to the stand the territorial representatives respon-
sible; that in 28 it offered no controverting evidence of any kind; that there was no evidence
that the home office took to task the branch managers or salesmen responsible for admitted
acts of coercion and inducement to handle Case products exclusively. The FTC pointed
out that it was the industry's frequent or general practice to refer all such complaints back
to the very district representatives about whom the dealers were complaining. FTC, REPORT
ON MANUFACTURE AND DISTRIBUTION OF FARM IMPLEMENTS 126, 136, 151 (1948). In these
circumstances the Government argued the court should have given far heavier probative
value to the written, documentary evidence of individual acts of coercion than to public
statements by central office executives renouncing the exercise of such pressure, or to testi-
mony that the dealers in question had been dropped for some other reasons than persistent
handling of competitors' products. Motion by Plaintiff for Amendment of Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and of the Judgment, pp. 10-13, United States v. J. I. Case Co.,
101 F. Supp. 856 (D. Minn. 1951).
199. Ibid.; Brief for the United .States, § 3, j 5, United States v. J. I. Case Co., 101 F.
Supp. 856 (D. Minn. 1951).
200. "[D]efendant Case is not immunized from the antitrust laws merely because in
many instances the oral understanding ... was thought to be mutually beneficial.... The
decision of the Supreme Court in the Standard Oil of California case did not turn upon
evidence of coercion. . . ." Motion of Plaintiff for Amendment of Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and of the Judgment, p. 18, United States v. J. I. Case Co., 101 F. Supp.
856 (D. Minn. 1951).
201. 101 F. Supp. 856, 865 (D. Minn. 1.951).
202. Id. at 863, 865.
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be little likelihood that the intensity of competition in the final market will
be diminished.203
The court found that Case's actions fell within these rather vague boundaries
of legitimacy. Company bulletins advised sales personnel not to be "over-
zealous," to avoid "dictating" to or "coercing" dealers with respect to the
lines they carried, while at the same time assuring the personnel that they
could insist on adequate representation°2 0 4 of the company's line. The court
attributed exclusive handling of Case's products not to pressure by the manu-
facturer, but to a mutual recognition that sound business practice demanded it,
and held that arrangements thus arrived at are legal.20
The court held that Case's policies had no substantial deleterious effect on
competition, actual or potential. Over 70%o of Case's dealers carried competi-
tive products, though few carried another full line. There was no testimony
from competing manufacturers that exclusive dealing had excluded them from
markets.208  On the contrary, the court found that most towns had dealers
representing nearly every full-line and many short-line manufacturers. It
found, in short, that workable competition prevailed. -20 7
The opinion in J. I. Case was an accurate interpretation of the law. Ex-
clusive dealing in farm equipment cannot be illegal per se. On the other
hand, there is force in the Government's contention that the record may have
justified an equity decree to redress a market situation characterized by ine-
qualities of competitive access, and of bargaining power between supplier and
dealer. It is impossible to characterize such inequality with any precision.
Manufacturers depend heavily on their dealers, who are their only direct
contact with the final customer. A good dealer can therefore offer consider-
able resistance to what he considers unjustified demands by a supplier, and
dealers have often been able to shift from one supplier to another. This op-
portunity has been enhanced by the entry of new full-line companies like
Ford and Ferguson. A big company, however, can get along without a
particular dealer, and the number of full-line companies is very limited. - -3
The right to handle the line of one of these companies may mean the dealer's
203. Ibid.
204. The judge conceded that "[T]he home office executives were inclined to leave the
problems of dealership largely to the branch managers and at times may have accepted
their decisions without a thorough investigation when controversies arose as to competitive
lines being carried by dealers .... " Id. at 861-2.
205. Id. at 867.
206. The Government pointed out that such evidence would have been difficult to obtain
for the years 1944-8 when the bottleneck in the industry was supply, not market outlets.
207. "[T]he evidence reflects that there is healthy competition among all farm ma-
chinery manufacturers." Id. at S66.
203. The number of farm equipment manufacturers has substantially increased in recent
years, but most of them are highly specialized, and cannot offer an)thing like a full line.
FTC RFPORT op. cit. supra note 196, at 66, 102-105. The production of farm implements,
considering the entire, highly variegated group as a whole (omitting only tractors) is rela-
tively unconcentrated. In 1947, the first four manufacturers accounted for 36.05, the first
eight for 46.6%, and the first twenty for 58.3% of national production. But the production
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entire livelihood, and be sufficiently precious to induce him to succumb to the
supplier's pressure to do things that are not necessarily in his or the public's
interest.
2 0 9
In these circumstances, the fact that buyers and sellers find exclusive con-
tractual relationships sufficiently satisfactory to enter into them does not
necessarily make them socially acceptable. The existence of mutual economic
advantages in such an arrangement does not justify a seller's insisting on it.
The presumption in antitrust law must be against exclusive tactics, and in
favor of easier entry into oligopolistic markets. The structure of the farm
machinery industry is not greatly different from that of the west coast petro-
leum industry.2 10 Since the policies of all the farm machinery leaders 211 paral-
leled those of Case, the court might well have found in this case, as the
Supreme Court did in Standard Stations, that exclusive dealing pQlicies illegal-
ly perpetuated a pattern of oligopoly.2 12 The important difference between the
two cases is that in Standard Stations exclusive dealing was the clearly
established practice and openly avowed policy of the defendant, and in
Case the practice was far looser. None the less, a decree prohibiting coercive
pressure for exclusive dealing might have forced Case to be more scrupulous
in keeping its field representatives from overstepping the bounds of reasonable
salesmanship.213
The antitrust laws have traditionally condemned certain kinds of busi-
ness behavior; they do not attack market situations or business arrangements.
of tractors, to which the full line is usually attached, is highly concentrated-with ratios
of 67.3, 87.6, and 97.0, respectively. Information submitted by the Secretary of Commerce
to the Celler Comm., Hearings, Ser. 14, pt. 2-B, p. 1438. See also United States v. J. I.
Case Co., 101 F. Supp. 856, 858 (D. Minn. 1951).
209. This is especially true if the dealer has invested heavily in specialized, distinctive
facilities in a location not readily convertible to other uses. After the war, several of the
manufacturers urged their dealers to erect more or less uniform "prototype" buildings,
on the outskirts of towns, where, many of the dealers complained, such buildings could not
be easily converted to another business. FTC REPoRT, op. cit. supra note 196, at 132-54.
210. Compare data on farm machinery industry, note 208 supra, with 1 BAIN, Op. Cit.
supra note 148, at 130-49.
211. The major exception is Allis Chalmers, which did not become ail important factor
in the industry until after 1936, and was therefore forced to contract with many dealers
already handling the lines of other manufacturers. FTC REPORT, op. Cit. sulpra note 196,
at 128.
212. See p. 318 .rupra.
213. "[I]n a substantial number of concrete instances oral exclusive dealing under-
standings were in fact entered into and ... acts of coercion or inducement were performed
by Case to obtain such .... Such concrete instances ... though limited in absolute or Tela-
tive numbers, when coupled with proof of expressions of a general exclusive dealer policy-
were sufficient to support an inference by the Court that a considerably larger number of
dealers than those shown by the proof have entered into similar . . . understandings, or
might be expected to . . . unless the defendant was enjoined." Motion of Plaintiff for
Amendment, supra note 198, at 17.
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Accordingly, the legal appraisal of full requirements contracts must
turn on whether or not they issue from the exerlion of market or fin-
ancial power, with the effect of constructing substantial impediments to
competitive entry.2 14 The more flagrant the exclusive tactics, the more clearly
they betray an intent to exclude, the less stringent should be the test of market
consequences. The prime question is whether the act of exclusion is unreason-
able, or stems merely from socially acceptable methods of vying for customer
patronage, and from the free decision of the dealer or buyer. These are the
traditional tests of the rule of reason, and they probably still apply. -15
When judged by these standards, the National City Lines and Motion Pic-
ture Advertising Service decisions emerge as the most doubtful of those dis-
214. See the persuasive argument along similar lines in Comment, Vcrtical Forestall-
ing under the Antitrust Laws, 19 U. or Cm. L. REv. 53, 617-19 (1952).
215. See McLaren, supra note 129, at 163-9. The foregoing summary has made no
reference to numerous actions brought by the FTC in recent years against exclusive deal-
ings. Only two of these actions, involving Automatic Canteen Co. and Motion Picture
Advertising Service Co. have thus far (November, 1953) been tested in the courts since
Standard Stations. Automatic Canteen occupied a "predominant position" in the leasing of
candy vending machines; it forced its distributors to handle its machines on an emclusive
basis, and tied to the leases of the machines the supply of the candy sold in them, thereby
becoming an important factor in the wholesaling of candy bars as well. The conclusion of
the Seventh Circuit seems entirely justified: "there certainly can be no question ... that the
actual effect... was to foreclose competitors from a substantial share of the market as to
both lines of petitioner's business .. " Automatic Canteen Co. v. United States, 194 F2d
433, 437 (7th Cir. 1952). Automatic Canteen appealed to the Supreme Court only that
portion of the Commission's order which was issued under § 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman
Act. See Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953), 63 YALE UJ. 260.
Commission attorneys who have worked on Clayton Act § 3 cases state that they have
moved to void exclusive arrangements only where they find evidence of appreciable injury
to competitors, and that it has not been their intention to condemn exclusive dealing as a
general, voluntarily selected method of doing business. See, e.g., Dictograph Products, Inc-,
FTC Dkt. 5655, p. 6 (initial decision Nov. 10, 1950); Revlon Products Corp., FTC Dkt.
5685, pp. 2-3, 8-13 (initial decision July 15,1952).
However, many individual decisions by FTC Trial Examiners seem content merely to
establish the fact of a manufacturer's insistence on exclusive dealing, often in exchange for
the grant of exclusive territorial distributorships, and to conclude on the basis of this
evidence alone either that the manufacturer had effectively established a "monopoly" in the
business of its tied distributors, or that "the effect... may be to substantially lessen com-
petition... and tend to create a monopoly." See, e.g., Beltone Hearing Aid Co., FTC Dt.
5825, p. 2 (initial decision Nov. 15, 1952).
This observer cannot escape the feeling that the Commission has carried out to the point
of absurdity the apparent suggestion of FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948) and
Standard Stations, that serious consideration of the competitive impact of the practices in
question is unnecessary. It has failed to realize the anticipated advantages of flexible and
ex-pert regulation of business practices by administrative commissions, rather than by judi-
cial combat, and has come perilously close to undermining its very reason for existence.
See the MPA case, 344 U.S. 392, 401-03 (1953) (dissenting opinion) ; FTC v. Ruberoid
Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952). See also WATxIzs, Punuc REGULATJI: or Co1-rF£WIr PrL c-
TicEs 219, 225 (1940); Statement of James M. Landis in ST CKIxG & WAmvzas, '&t-
XOPOLY AND Fnr.n E.-rmaisE 548 n.7 (1951).
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cussed.216 No evidence of coercion was introduced in either case. In the
absence of exclusive tactics, the demonstration of competitive impact was
surely inadequate.217 On the other hand, in J. I. Case the importance of an
intermediate market represented by thousands of farm equipment dealers
should certainly have justified a decree prohibiting the few firms that dominate
this market from exerting unreasonable pressure to exclude competitors.
These criteria do not require that all exclusive arrangements be outlawed.
If a marketing arrangement helps a firm to break into a new market, it clearly
does not represent the use of appreciable market power 218 to create an un-
reasonable obstruction to competitive entry.2 19 If, as in I. I. Case, the courts
can be convinced that exclusive dealing is necessary to protect the good will
attaching to a manufacturer's product, they will not condemn it :220 either
because, under Clayton Act proceedings, the effect could not raise an inference
of reasonable probability of harm to competition, or because, tinder the Sher-
man Act's traditional criterion of reasonable restraint, the intent in such
cases is to compete rather than to exclude.
The cases show the impracticality of drawing the line between reasonable
and unreasonable restraints on the basis of purely economic judgments of
industrial performance. Whether the economist would agree with the court in
J. I. Case that competition is effective in farm machinery would depend on
the economist.22' The same is true in petroleum. One must concede that an
unhampered insistence on exclusive dealing or full requirements contracts by
216. Times-Picayune is also doubtful but for different reasons. See pp. 325-6 siupra,
217. On MPA, see Hodson, The Manufacturers Right to His Dealer's Loyalty in the
Light of the M.P.A. Case in 1952 SYmposium 187-92, 199-200.
218. This admittedly implies the need for a market structure test, see Kahn, supra note
9, at 53-4, and explains the necessity for deciding, in such cases as American Can and
Times-Picayune, whether the defendants enjoyed a "dominant position." The application
of the test of "dominance" cannot be rigorous in economic terms: How does one measure
"dominance" or "power," and draw the line between the unreasonable exercise of sub-
stantial market power from the uncoercive adoption of a reasonable exclusive relation-
ship? The primary evidence of the sufficiency of the power must be its exercise. Moreover,
there is no implication here that the law should condemn market power itself, unless abused
or attained by unreasonable means.
219. Courts have refused to condemn exclusive dealing arrangements by small or new
firms. See United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944) ; Excelsior
Motor Mfg. & Supply Co. v. Sound Equipment, Inc., 73 F.2d 725 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
294 U.S. 706 (1934) ; B. S. Pearsall Butter Co. v. FTC, 292 Fed. 720 (7th Cir. 1923).
Obviously none of the -recently outlawed exclusive dealing arrangements could have
been justified on the ground that they were used by small manufacturers as a means of
breaking into a market.
220. See note 129 supra and accompanying text.
221. See, e.g., Wucox, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 126-7,
168-70. (TNEC Monograph 21, 1940) (classes the farm machinery industry as "monopo-
lized," partly because of its exclusive dealing practices). Accord: NUTrER, TInE ExTENT
OF ENTERPISE MONOPOLY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1899-1939 p. 86 (1951) ; STIGLER, FIvW
LEcTuREs ON ECONOMIC PROi.EMS 56 (1949).
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J. I. Case, Standard of California or American Can would be most unlikely
in itself to increase substantially their respective market shares. Nor would
sweeping antitrust condemnations of exclusive arrangements radically change
either the competitive methods or the economic performance of the farm
machinery, petroleum and can industries. Yet, it is reasonable to conclude
that a pattern of oligopoly control of markets may be indefinitely extended,
and entry continually hampered, by the insistence of all the dominant pro-
ducers on this marketing practice. Against the benefit to the consumer because
a big manufacturer can plan more effectively and can hold retailers to higher
levels of performance under exclusive systems of marketing, must be weighed
the consumer's interest in the widest possible range of choice among manu-
facturers and in being served by retailers sufficiently expert and free to help
him choose the particular products that best meet his particular needs."-
Although some commentators imply that a blanket prohibition of the use of
power to exclude competitors from "a substantial market" may "indiscrimin-
ately strike down the good with the bad," - the seriousness of the risk has yet
to be demonstrated.
VERTICAL INTEGRATION-PERSISTENCE OF THE DOUBLE STANDARD
There has always been a double standard in the antitrust laws. Restrictive
agreements between separate firms are more severely treated than proprietary
consolidations enjoying just as great or greater market power. The double
standard appeared in the contrasting treatment accorded the first two groups
of business defendants whose cases reached the Supreme Court-one involv-
ing a merger, the other a price-fidng conspiracy.2 4 The decision which
222. The proponents of workable competition have pointed out that where the market
is imperfect in some respects, other imperfections may be required for effective perfor-
mance. For example, if sellers are few, price rivalry may be greater to the extent that
sellers are imperfectly aware of what their rivals are charging. See CL , Toward a
Concept of Workable Competition in RE, .ixoNS IN THE SOCL-,. COn'orL or INMUsMY"
453-4, 464-5, 468-71 (1942). Imperfect market information may be regarded as a sort of
"offsetting imperfection"--offsetting the imperfection of fewness of sellers. In the case of
exclusive dealing, perhaps, we have the opposite situation. The contention that exclusive
dealers (who are not given the opportunity to be anything but exclusive), each vying for
the customer's patronage, will provide effective competitive performance perhaps assumes
greater market perfection than actually prevails. The imperfection of competition resulting
from inadequate consumer knowledge, discernment, and ability to shop around necessitates
an "offsetting perfection"---the protection of dealers who are themselves free to shop around
and advise their customers. Exclusive dealing is supposed to make for the provision of
better service; here is a service it eliminates.
223. Lockhart & Sacks, supra note 113, at 940.
224. Compare United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), uith United
States v. Trans-Mfissouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1S97). The American Sugar Refin-
ing Company's acquisition of 98% control over domestic sugar production by purchasing
the stock of four competitors was exonerated in E. C. Knight on constitutional grojunds;
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finally established that the law could reach mergers in industry22 6 at the
same time set forth the rule of reason, which, subsequent decisions demon-
strated, re-established the double standard in another form.220 A big firm,
however powerful, had to misbehave to fall afoul of the law; a price-fixing
or market-sharing agreement among separate firms, though covering no
greater a share of the market than the single firm, was illegal per se. Judge
Hand's decision in Alcoa was the first instance in which a court of final juris-
diction 227 explicitly rejected this dual approach; the evil, he said, was mon-
opoly power, in whatever form.228 But this vigorous attack on monopoly
power per se was limited to true "monopolies" in the classic sense. And the
subsequent cigarette and movie cases hinged not merely on the market power
conveyed by size and integration, but on the intent to exclude competitors.
Probably no single case has 'been more responsible than the criminal and
civil suits against A & P 229 for the widespread but erroneous impression that
the Court held that the consolidation affected' manufacturing, not interstate commerce. The
resulting consolidation enjoyed at least as effective a monopoly power as the loose price-
fixing agreement in Trans-Missouri Freight, and a far greater share of the market than
was covered by the market sharing agreement condemned in Addyston Pipe and Steel Co.
v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). Here was an early version of the double standard:
a price-fixing or market sharing agreement is illegal per se because it restrains trade
directly; a consolidation cannot be reached because it influences commerce only indirectly.
HANDLER, A STUDY OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST
LAWS 40, 46-7 (TNEC Monograph 38, 1941).
225. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
226. See STOCKINa & WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE 276 (1951). Ap-
palachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933) sought to eradicate this double
standard, basing its evaluation of a restrictive agreement on its market power: "We agree
that there is no ground for holding defendants' plan illegal merely because they have not
integrated their properties and have chosen to maintain their independent plants. .. ."
Id. at 376. However, United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. ISO (1940) re-
established the double standard: so far as "loose" combinations were concerned, measure-
ments of market power were held unnecessary. See HANDLER, op. cit. supra note 224, at
33-4, 85-6.
For a documentation and criticism of the double standard in the more severe treatment
of group boycotts than of individual refusals to sell, see Comment, Refusals to Sell and
Public Control of Comipetition, 58 YALE L.J. 1121, 1136-41 (1949).
227. Since four Supreme Court Justices disqualified themselves from sitting, the cir-
cuit court of appeals was constituted the court of final jurisdiction by special statutory
enactment. 15 U.S.C. 6A, par. 29. 28 U.S.C. § 2109 (1946).
228. Judge L. Hand said it would be "absurd" to condemn unconditionally price-fixing
conspiracies "and not to extend the condemnation to monopolies." 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d
Cir. 1.945).
229. United States v. New York Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626
(E.D. Ill. 1946), aff'd, 173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949) ; Civil Action No. 52-139, S.D.N.Y.,
Sept. 15, 1949 (divestiture and dissolution proceedings). "When one examines in detail
the 'abuses,' they turn out to be only a complicated way of describing size, efficiency and
integration." Adelman, Rejoinder on the A & P Case, 15 J. OF MARKETING 219 (1950).
See also Note, Trouble Begins in the "New" Sherman Act: The Pcrplexing Story of
the A & P Case, 58 YALE L.J. 969 (1949).
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the law now condemns integration and size.2 ° Admittedly, the courts inade-
quately differentiated the economically beneficial and legally "reasonable" from
the undesirable and unreasonable aspects of A & P's organization and tactics
and their consequences. However, even a hasty perusal of the district court's
opinion should satisfy any fair reader that the impression is essentially an
illusion. To be sure, A & P would probably have escaped antitrust prosecution
had it not also been large, integrated, and aggressive. But it was not convicted
on these grounds. According to the court, the Government had contended,
and would have to prove "that the size of A & P, its integration... were so
employed as to bring about inevitably unreasonable advantages. . . . The
charge is that defendants have so utilized their power and integration as un-
reasonably to restrain commerce." 231 Certainly this is what the court thought
the Government had proved. The opinion is replete with clear-cut disavowals
of hostility to size and integration alone.23
2
It seems impossible to doubt that the court conscientiously tried to apply
a rule of reason in the A & P case, and to differentiate mere size and integra-
tion from abuse of the power that they conferred. The court's analysis of
A & P's operations centered on the sources and uses of the company's "head-
quarters profits." Scattered references to the "subsidization" of retail opera-
tions by these "profits," particularly those referring to the "profits" from
manufacturing, appear to betray a basic hostility toward vertical integration
itself. But the discussion consists almost entirely of a demonstration that all
but the "profits" from manufacturing were tainted in their source-being the
product of coercive bargaining-and all were deliberately misused at the retail
level.233
According to the "new critics" of the Sherman Act, A & P would not have been
condemned under the "old" rule of reason. Competition may be fostered by big
230. See Adelman in 1951 Sy.,rPosiumx 143-7; Adelman, Integration and Antitrust
Policy, 63 Haav. L. RE,. 27 (1949). Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy,
58 J. POL Ecox. 347 (1950). See sources cited in notes 103 and 229 supra.
231. 67 F. Supp. 626, 642 (E.D. Ill. 1946) (emphasis added).
232. Id. at 630-1, 638.
233. See Dirlam & Kahn, Integration and Dissolution of the A & P Company, 29 Ihw.
L.J. 1 (1953). Thus, significantly, Judge Lindley has very little to say about manufactur-
ing operations themselves, which, considered in isolation, were certainly unexceptionable.
A quantitative breakdown of the district court's opinion shows clearly where the heaviest
stress was placed. A factual analysis of the defendant's operations covers 29 pages dis-
tributed in the following manner: persistent efforts after 1936 to receive the equivalent of
brokerage from suppliers (3 pages) ; systematic quest for discriminatory concessions bear-
ing no relationship to savings in cost or the performance of functions (9 pages) ; practices
of A & P's buying subsidiary, the Atlantic Commission Co. (ACCO), which also acted as
broker for the trade, particularly emphasizing ACCO's abuse of its monopsonistic and mo-
nopolistic powers (9 pages); retail policies which exhibited instance after instance of
manifestly predatory local price cutting, operation of individual stores and regions "in thu
red," etc. (8 pages).
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buyers bargaining hard with suppliers or cutting retail margins, even if selective-
ly. The antitrust laws did not interfere with this impure yet competitive market
behavior as long as the rule of reason took into consideration the market results,
and not merely the unfair disadvantaging of smaller competitors. There was
no evidence that A & P had achieved any substantial monopoly power, or that
its retail and bargaining tactics had seriously jeopardized competition in the
retail grocery business. It is therefore difficult to construct a positive defense
of the A & P decision in purely economic terms. Nevertheless, in terms of
the values of a free enterprise system, many of the company's actions were
indefensible. A & P may not have enjoyed substantial monopoly power in
most of its markets; yet in some, where it controlled a very large share, it
must have had some such power; and it unquestionably enjoyed and abused
certain kinds of "power."23 4
The appropriate question, then, is whether or not the A & P case has
brought to light a conflict between the requirements of workable competition
and the mores of a free enterprise system.2 35 The conflict is not a serious one.
The contributions to superior economic performance by those activities of
A & P which are now clearly illegal were relatively unimportant when com-
pared with the legitimate contributions of its integrated organization and oper-
ations.23 6 Against the possible contributions to workable competition by
A & P's pressure on suppliers for discriminatory preferences and its selective
local price cutting must be weighed the exploitation of weaker suppliers, and
234. See Hirsch & Votaw, Giant Grocery Retailing and the Antitrnst Laws, 25 J. or
BusiNEss 1 (1952).
235. Appraisal of this apparent conflict is impossible on a priori grounds. Having
labelled big buyers in general as practitioners of "countervailing power," and having de-
fined the latter as offsetting "original" power, hence beneficent, Galbraith is able to write
at length and with conviction about the A & P case with only minimal reference to the
facts. GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM cC. 9-10 (1952). In much the same way, he is
able to explain the rise of unions in terms of countervailing power. "As a general though
not invariable rule there are strong unions in the United States only where markets are
served by strong corporations." Id. at 122. He failed to point out that four of the six
biggest national unions in the United States today are the teamsters, carpenters and
joiners, machinists, and mine workers.
"Countervailing power" is not always or necessarily beneficial, unless one defines it so.
The same power may be used to "countervail" or to exploit. It may be used in a way which
in the end benefits the consumer, or it may be exercised only in the interest of its possessor.
It may enhance competition; it may, by its spread, result in the comprehensive cartelization
of the corporate state. It is difficult to distinguish the latter outcome from the one Gal-
braith has in mind in suggesting that the solution for all problems of power is counter-
organization on the other side of the market. When everyone is organized, all power is
countervailing, and the only possible arbiter is the government.
236. See Dirlam & Kahn, Antitrust Law and the Big Buyer: Another Look at the A
& P Case, 60 J. PoL EcoN. 118 (1952). However, there is no justification for divestiture
of the manufacturing divisions; the competitive advantages they conferred were legally
and economically unexceptionable.
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the discouragement to new entrants and to retail competition posed by dis-
criminatory sharpshooting designed to demonstrate to the grocery that dares
to open in an A & P town "that they have no place in the supermarket busi-
ness in Richmond. ' 237 The industry's performance is likely to improve rather
than suffer if A & P is broken up in order to reduce its power to engage in
unfair competition. As in the retailing of gasoline, so in groceries, the large-
volume, low-margin outlet was an innovation of local independents, not the
great chains. To the extent that grocery chains are denied recourse to price
discrimination and to the resources of parents and affiliates, the opportunities
for such independent entry are enhanced, and the chains themselves might
be forced into more drastic and socially more beneficial adjustments to meet
competition.
Vertical Integration and "Specific" Intent
The "new" Sherman Act, like the "old," condemns vertical integration only
when it represents a device for extending monopoly power from one stratum
to another..2 38 Very little is required in the w.-ay of a demonstration of market
consequences, if a course of conduct may clearly be characterized as betraying
such an intent to monopolize. On the other hand, if a course of conduct can-
not be so clearly characterized, the "new" Sherman Act reserves its censure
for actions or structures that threaten to impair the effectiveness of competi-
tion in the market regarded as a whole. Thus, in Yellow Cab the defendants'
stock purchases did not reveal an intent to monopolize,2 a and, since the impact
on market competition was minimal, the Government eventually lost the
case.240 Similarly in Colunbiar Steel,2 41 the Supreme Court established be-
yond all question that in the presence of legitimate business reasons for the
acquisition of a customer, vertical integration 2 2 is not invalid merely because
it shuts competitors out of three percent of a market. - 3 However, the Court
recognized that "legitimate" intent would not exonerate mergers with truly
substantial overall market consequences, and therefore grappled conscientious-
237. 67 F. Supp. 626,669 (E.D. Ill 1946).
238. See discussion in Hale, supra note 61, at 923-27. See also Comment, Verlical Fore-
stalling under the Antitrust Laews, 19 U. oF CHI. L Rnv. 533, 584-6 (1952).
239. 80F. Supp. 936, 942 (N.D. Ill. 1948).
240. 338 U.S. 338 (1949).
241. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1943).
242. We confine our discussion to the vertical integration aspects of the merger. To
some e.xtent, U.S. Steel and Consolidated, twvo of the defendants, were also comNetitors in
the fabricated steel market.
243. Note the contrast with International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392
(1947), where the action itself was suspect, and the required test of consequences therefore
minimal; and with United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1951),
aff'd per curiam, 343 U.S. 922 (1952), where requirements contracts involved a share of the
entire West Coast gasoline market, see note 123 supra, comparable to the share of the
regional market at issue in Columbia Steel
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ly with the economic facts to see whether or not the defendant's acquisition
would have "the effect . . . [of) unreasonably restrict[ing] the opportunities
of competitors to market their product. '244
Cohmbia Steel was based on questionable findings of fact. In ascertaining
the intent underlying the acquisition, the Court essentially accepted at face
value U.S. Steel's contention that it had to control an outlet for its Geneva
output.245 Moreover, in terms of the size, origin and already substantial
power of U.S. Steel, and the pattern of limited competition that has for
decades characterized the steel industry,2 40 the market consequences of the
acquisition should have been apparent. However, the blessing which the At-
torney General previously conferred on the disposal of the Geneva plant to
U.S. Steel unfortunately confined the instant case to the narrower question
of the legality of the one subsequent acquisition. 247
Given the limited issue, the Court might still have interpreted the facts
differently. 248 It might well have concluded that the social drawbacks of per-
mitting the dominant steel company to acquire rather than to construct a con-
trolled outlet more than offset "the legitimate business reasons" for choosing
the former course. Certainly the Federal Trade Commission, in enforcing the
amended Section 7 of the Clayton Act,2 9 should make precisely this kind of
244. 334 U.S. 495, 524 (1948). "In determining what constitutes unreasonable re-
straint, we do not think the dollar volume is in itself of compelling significance; we look
rather to the percentage of business controlled, the strength of the remaining competition
... the probable development of the industry, consumer demands, and other characteristics
of the market. We do not undertake to prescribe any set of percentage figures by which
to measure the reasonableness of a corporation's enlargement of its activities by the pur-
chase of the assets of a competitor. The relative effect of percentage command of a market
varies with the setting in which that factor is placed." Id. at 527-8. The one criterion
applied by the Court which is omitted from the foregoing quotation is the one of intent:
"whether the action springs from business requirements or purpose to monopolize." Ibid.
Under the "new" Sherman Act this consideration is alternative to the other; if the intent is
to exclude, the action is objectionable if any appreciable dollar volume is affected. As the
majority opinion put it, an individual acquisition is illegal if it "'results in or is aimed at
unreasonable restraint." Ibid. See the clear statement of this legal criterion in United
States v. Reading Co., 226 U.S. 324, 370 (1912). See also note 105 supra.
245. In contrast, the dissenting Justices condemned the merger because it was a "pur-
chase for control" in avoidance of competition. See 334 U.S. 495, 537 (1948).
246. See ADAMS, THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY c. 5 (1951).
247. The Court mentioned the long history of acquisitions by U.S. Steel, offered by the
Government to support its charge that the !purchase of Consolidated was only one link in a
chain of "monopolizing." But, without ever really appraising that record, it turned its
attention immediately to the intent underlying the Consolidated merger alone, finding it
a reasonable supplement to the Geneva purchase. 334 U.S. 495, 532 (1948).
248. One of the economic criteria suggested by the Court was the effect of the merger
on the opportunities of competitors. For the evidence, not presented to the Court, that the
acquisition of Consolidated was a direct and heavy blow to Kaiser, see Comment, Vertical
Forestalling under the Antitrst Laws, 19 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 583, 591-2 n.62 (1952).
249. See note 257 infra.
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appraisal of the relative economic merits of mergers versus expansion by con-
struction of new facilities.
250
The dissenters in the second Yellow Cab case would have relieved the
Government of the necessity of demonstrating a "specific intent" to monopo-
lize, and retained the attenuated requirement of competitive impact accepted
in the International Salt and first Yellow Cab cases. They would have had
the decision turn on whether or not "the freedom of the taxicab companies
to buy taxicabs has been hobbled by the defendants' business arrange-
ments .... ,,251 Since vertical integration by merger ordinarily "hobbles"
the subsequent freedom of choice of the merged firms, the dissenters apparently
seek the complete abolition of the rule of reason applied to such acquisitions.
However, a good case can be made for upholding the Government's complaint
in Yellow Cab, even under the rule of reason. Here, as in Cohmbia Steel,
we have the phenomenon of mergers for "ordinary business reasons" which
may none the less be economically undesirable, even though it is difficult to
prove a substantial resultant impairment of the force of competition in the
market as a whole. The rule of reason does not preclude asking w.hat socially
beneficent considerations might justify a taxicab manufacturer's acquiring
control of a number of operating companies, most of which held monopolies
in their respective local markets. And if, as appears to have been the case
here, the operating companies, after the transfer of financial control, began
to buy the higher-priced cabs of the acquiring manufacturer exclusively, the
economist may wonder whether the cab rider did not eventually pay higher
prices; and the judge may well agree with the Government that the defendants
had effected an unreasonable restraint by using vertical integration to extend
the benefits of monopoly from one market to another.2 2
The Ine-zitability of a Double Standard
Restrictive agreements and the exertion of monopolistic leverage reveal a
manifest intent to exclude or unfairly handicap competitors, which is not neces-
250. It would be advantageous if "the limitation of [business] size applied to mergers
only and the growth of the single concern, by acquiring more customers, were permitted
without limit." Clark, The Orientation of Antitrust Policy, 40 AsEx. Eco::. REv. Sunp. 93,
96 (1950).
251. bmtcu States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338, 343 (1949).
252. Professor Spengler has demonstrated that vertical integration should make for
lower, not higher, prices when suppliers with monopoly power are merged with customers
downstream. Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58 J. Pot. Eco::. 347-52 (1950).
However if, as is the case in most businesses, a downstream monopolist's pricing formula
before merger was on a cost-plus basis, a supplier who gains control of that custumer may
be in a position to insert a monopoly surcharge which will be passed on to the customer.
The supplying firm is particularly likely to do so if the financial interest of its managers
in the downstream affiliate is less than in the manufacturing end of the business. The
"Spengler effect" occurs only to the extent that intermediate guods are passed between
affiliates at cost.
1954]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
sarily present in cases involving vertical integration. The Griffith case in-
volved manifestly exclusive tactics; an integrated theater chain used its bar-
gaining power and market leverage to obtain unfair advantages over com-
petitors. What was true of the tactics of the Griffith chain was also true in
a sense of the condemned activities or contracts in Standard Stations, Rich-
field, American Can, International Salt, and even National City Lines. The
company policies producing these contractual provisions or understandings
were exclusionary on their face. Moreover, the defendants could have
achieved most of the economically legitimate benefits without the imposition
of restrictive, exclusive clauses. Condemnation, therefore, required-and in
Times-Picayune should have required-demonstration of a lesser degree of
competitive impact than in the case of vertical integration. In Columbia Steel
and Yellow Cab, on the other hand, any handicaps imposed on competitors
were merely the incidental consequences of integration by merger. The intent
underlying vertical integration by merger is seldom clearly exclusionary. It
may have other, socially acceptable purposes and consequences. Only if
market leverage is exerted to force the transaction, or, after the merger has
occurred, to put competitors at an unreasonable disadvantage is a virtually
per se condemnation, similar to that of restrictive agreements, either legally
or economically justified. This is the inescapable double standard.253
Critics of the Columbia Steel and second Yellow Cab decisions on the one
hand, and of Standard Stations and National City Lines on the other, join in
arguing that it is inconsistent to permit a firm to do by financial acquisition
what it may not do by contract. 254 The criticism has considerable force. It
supports the logic of the recent amendment to Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
or to proposed amendments which would condemn excessively monopolistic
market structures.2 5
5
253. The line between National City Lines and Yellow Cab is in many ways so fine
as to be nearly invisible. In both, a supplier provided long-term capital and obtained in
exchange exclusive supply arrangements. Even the evidence bearing on intent was strik-
ingly similar; in both, apparently, financial difficulties of the customer companies
provided the occasion for seeking capital of the suppliers; in both it was alleged that
the suppliers had purchased the stock at inflated values. The "standards" of competitive
impact were identical.
The only differences were that (a) the supplier was a group of non-competing "con-
spirators" in National City Lines, and one manufacturer in Yellow Cab; (b) formal finan-
cial and managerial consolidation took place in Yellow Cab but not in National City Lines;
and (c) apparently the courts found something more in the way of evidence of a concert and
plan of action by the supplier defendants with the primary purpose of obtaining exclusive
supply contracts in National City Lines than in Yellow Cab.
254. See the dissent of Justice Douglas in United States v. Standard Oil Co., 337 U.S.
293, 315 (1949) ; McLaren, supra note 129, at 143.
"Not the incidence of objectionable market control, but the adventitious possibility of
forcing a situation into a familiar legal mold, controls our antitrust policy." Adelman,
Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 HARv. L. REv. 1289, 1349 (1948).
255. See, e.g., the draft of a statute submitted by Walter Adams to the Celler Comm.
Hearings, Ser. 14, pt. 2B, 1600; the proposal of George Stigler, id., pt. 4A, 133-4; also
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But any attempt to apply to integration, even if by merger, the same treat-
ment as the new Sherman Act applies to exclusive dealing imposed by a
dominant firm ignores an essential element of a profit system. If a company
is willing to assume the risks of ownership, it must be permitted a wider
measure of control than where it is contracting with independent parties.
Investment cannot be equated at law with coercion and exclusion. It would
also be economically disastrous to deny to a big business the right to produce
for its own needs or to do its own marketing; to utilize some by-product
idea or material in a new field; or to enter some new market, perhaps by
acquiring a firm already there. Such integration is a prime source of economic
progress, and effective competition. The achievement of such differential
advantages by coercion of suppliers into discriminatory preferences, or of
marketers or customers into exclusive arrangements, does not make a com-
parable contribution. -ao
For this reason, it is inconceivable that the courts will apply the same test
of competitive impact under the amended Section 7 of the Clayton Act 27 as
they now do in Section 3 cases. The Senate Committee reported that the
amended Section 7 "would not apply to the mere possibility but only to the
reasonable probability of the prescribed effect .... ,-"3s Even apart from this
evidence of congressional intent, the courts will continue to require a broader
consideration of overall economic consequences in cases involving mutually
agreed-upon transfers of property, particularly those motivated by an intent
to increase competition, than in cases where defendants have made coercive
Bowman, Toward Less Monopoly. 101 U. OF PA. L. REv. 577 (1953). I do not reject such
proposals. My contention is only that such economic criteria can never play more than a
subsidiary role in a general antitrust law,, whose purpose is to provide general rules of busi-
ness conduct appropriate to a free enterprise system. Particularly in the case of mergers,
which represent no new investment for society, it may be entirely appropriate to apply
standards of probable economic effect. But even here the test will have to be in part the
traditional one (what were the contracting parties doing or trying to do?) rather than
merely the economic one (is the result of what they are prolosing likely to be "good" or
"bad"?). This view is supported by the approving quotation from Internatio:al Shoe, refus-
ing to condemn a merger "not with a purpose to lessen competition," in the Initial Decision
of the FTC Hearing Examiner in the Pillsbury Mills case, under the amended § 7; Dkt.
6000 (filed A-pril 22, 1953). See Comment, U'ertical Forestalling trnder the Antitrust Laws,
19 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 583, 611 n.173 (1952).
256. If, for example, a powerful buyer is denied the right to demand discriminatory
concessions, this is all the more reason why he should be permitted to "rdl his own" in order
to circumvent the monopoly power of suppliers.
257. "No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire ... the whole or any part
of the stock or other share capital and no corporation.., shall acquire the whole or any part
of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of com-
merce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." 64 STAT. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 13
(Supp. 1952).
258. SFN. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.. o (1950).
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use of market leverage to exclude competitors.25 9 It is doubtful, therefore,
that "the new law repeals ... the rule of reason. 12 6 °
CONCLUSION
The underlying assumption of our antitrust laws is that competition cannot
long remain effective if it is not also regulated in such a way as to keep it a
fair contest on the basis of efficiency in serving the public. The laws seek to
preserve both fairness and effectiveness by prohibiting collusion, unreasonable
agglomeration, the wielding of massed power, and exclusive practices which
suppress or pervert the competitive process. It is doubtful that economics
supplies any more effective criteria of unreasonable restraint or undesirable
monopolization than these traditional legal concepts. The "new critics" of
antitrust argue that it is possible for exclusive, coercive or discriminatory
contracts or actions to contribute to workable competition and economic
progress.26 1 Although a plausible a priori case can be made for this conten-
tion, the economic evidence is by no means convincing. Attempts to demon-
strate the beneficial consequences of discrimination and exclusive systems of
distribution are usually confined to an exposition of their undeniably com-
259. See Eaton, Joint Ventures in 1952 SYmposium 139. The Committee's statement
applies, strictly, to the required degree of proof rather than to the scope of the required
economic investigation, as Lockhart and Sacks have pointed out in another connection,
supra note 1.13, at 939. But the two inquiries are related. If it were necessary to demon-
strate merely that a merger inight possibly injure competition, a narrower inquiry would
suffice; the demonstration of a reasonable probability of injury calls for a balanced ap-
praisal of the net impact on the market as a whole.
See also the initial decision in the Pillsbury Mills case, note 255 supra, and the analogous
case before the FCC involving the proposed merger of United Paramount Theaters and the
American Broadcasting Company. A majority of the Commission sanctioned the merger,
on the ground that it would create a strong competitor to CBS and NBC in radio and tele-
vision, and would be prevented by its competitors both in television and in motion picture
exhibition from exercising any monopolistic restriction in either field. In short, it looked
to the probable effects on competition in the market as a whole. In her dissent, Commis-
sioner Hennock looked instead to the immediate suppression of competition between. the
merging parties, and cited Morton Salt Co. v. FTC, 334 U.S. 37 (1948), as supporting her
view that Section 7 requires the demonstration only of a "'reasonable possibility' that the
merger may lessen competition." FCC Dkt. 10046 (February 9, 1953).
260. Adelman in 1951 SymPosium! 149. See also Carson, Corporate Merger in 1952
SYmposium 172-5 (supporting my view).
261. It has been argued, for example, that the exclusive arrangement permits an ethical
manufacturer to ensure careful fitting and intelligent prescription of hearing aids and thus
to avoid the evils of "self-service" or "5 and 10 cent store distribution" in a field where
the customer needs expert advice and protection from his own ignorance. The question
remains whether exclusive dealing is either a necessary or a sufficient condition for achiev-
ing these desirable ends. As for the former, ethical manufacturers might still refuse to sell
to 5 and 10 cent stores. As for the latter, see the stipulations as to the facts, and the agree-
ments to cease and desist from alleged misleading advertising in the cases of Beltone Hear-
ing Aid Company, Dictograph Products, Sonotone Corporation, and Microtone Company,
FTC Stipulation Nos. 8269, 8277, 8278, 8279 (June 14, 1952).
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petitive aspects: the supplier is forced to reduce his price selectively to get
the business ;2'2 the manufacturer imposes exclusive dealing to cut costs or
intensify his selling effort.2 63 On the other hand, opponents of such practices
usually confine themselves to a demonstration of their anti-competitive aspects:
the supplier maintains his price to less powerful or fortunately situated buyers;
exclusive dealing excludes competitors. Both arguments are inadequate.
The conclusion drawn from the foregoing appraisal of leading antitrust
cases of the last ten years is that the traditional presumption against exclusive
tactics and systematic discrimination remains at the core of the law, and is a
justified one. A free enterprise system cannot tolerate substantial and per-
sistent disparities between reality and the ideal of a fair field and no
favors. Inevitable differences in competitive strength and threats to free com-
petition on the basis of efficiency are created by inequalities in access to capital,
and by the inherent competitive advantages of size, established position, and
integration. The "new" Sherman and Clayton Acts intervene only when
these advantages and these threats are compounded through coercion, exclu-
sion, and systematic discrimination; it would require more convincing demon-
strations that these tactics are necessary for effective competition than have
hertofore been offered, to prove that the economic theory of the "new" Sher-
man and Clayton Acts is unsound.
262. Even selective price reductions offered in good faith may conceivably be objected
to on the ground that they permit powerful sellers, enjoying the earnings from a broader
market, in effect, to discipline unruly smaller price cutters or at least to subject them to
unfair competitive pressure. Thus, in a number of cases, the FTC has taken the position
that an illegal "injury to competition" occurs if a big seller succeeds in taking customers
away from competitors by offering selective price concessions. See Minneapolis-Honey-wrell
Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 2Q6 (1952) ;
Brief for the Commission, pp. 16-17, Curtiss Candy Co., Dkts. 4673 and 4556 (Nov. 29,
1945). The attack on such price differentiation should surely be required to make a more
convincing showing of substantial effect than the Commission has been demanding.
263. However it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that current pressures for exclusive
dealing in electrical appliances, for example, are aimed primarily at halting the "chaos"
of severe price competition at the retail level. See Appliances Head for a Showdoe,
Business Week, July 18, 1953, pp. 66-8.
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